better to consolidate his forces. We desired very much to give him the points of greatest public interest, but he expressed familiarity with them; still we pressed a brief and unsatisfactory statementk of the coal, iron, and railroad interests in the Cahaba fields. A single raid will derange and stampede the whole system, upon which the Government is so much dependent. Such a thing is inevitable. Should General Roddey be removed the destruction of the ten or twelveiron furnaces, cutting the railroads and suspending the daily supply of coal in all that latitude, dispersing the very large forces of hands engaged in those works, including those at work on the Central Railroad, necessary to all the other enterprises, all affecting the vitality of the Confederacy, will most certainly follow. All of North Alabama will be uncovered. The Government works at Selma, especially a fine gun-boat or two, and private interests to an incalculable extent, must thereby incur extreme hazard. In our own part of the State complete destruction must follow. The Tennessee Valley should be protected as a grain country. It is in ahigh latitude and of immense capacity, and we can at all times support a good army. The Tennessee River affords an easy line of defense. General Roddey has held it against the body of the Army of the Cumberland, though we suppose the enemy or eon the north side to obtain subsistence mainly. The river is now forded along the Muscle Shoals, and they appear in great numbers on the opposite bank. North Alabama is the gateway to Middle Tennessee, from whence we obtain recruits, stock, and most of the subsistence for those troops immediately upon the river. General Roddey's troops are made up in North Alabama, and naturally they prefer to remain in front of their own homes. His command is in process of organization and large increase. To remove it at this time one-half of it we fear might be lost to the service. General Roddey is mild, conciliating, and popular, and can concentrate the mountain population between Tuscaloosa and the Tennessee River. Fifteen or more companites are organizing, which it is almost certain will be suspended. The Secretary of War declared that General Roddey's command would not be removed. We desire the general good, and are not influenced by any narrow, selfish view. We had expected that in the spring the enemy would move toward East Tennessee, and that General Roddey would move correspondingly, and when there would not exist the same necessity for his remaining in his present position. The extreme distress of our people, having suffered unutterably, will be increased at the imepending danger, and their sacrifices consequent upon their devotion and loyalty demand the highest consideration of their interests.

We asked General Johnston to modify his order to remove General Patterson and Pickett, as already ordered by General Roddey, from Okolona, Miss., to Gadsden, and to place Colonel Hannon west of the Sand Mountain, his right resting against it and his left upon the Tennessee River and near the eastern boundary of Morgan County. This region can subsist that regiment, and it will be in eacy communication with Gadsden or the Tennessee Valley west and facing the enemy. Also we asked that Lieutenant-Colonel Moreland's battalion be left to picket the Tennessee River in conjunction with Colonel Johnson's regiment (Fourth Alabama Cavalry), the order having been to retain oneof General Roddey's best regiments for that purpose. Major George is in command at Corinth, by which much subsistence andmany recruits already enrolled are to be brought out of West Tennessee. If nothing elsecan be had, this might give confidence and induce the people of