Whitesburg, consistuting a picket-line of upward of 100 miles in a straight direction, without computing the meanderings of the river. They (the enemy), if they shall succeeded in thus unexpectedly occupying a valley heretofore defended by us, particularly when Sherman's corps essayed to pass though it to re-enforce Grant with great obstinacy, may resume the idea of a railroad communication continuously from Stevenson via Decatur and Corinth with Memphis and reoccupy Corinth, the inducement to hold which place was relatively so small while we held the valley above and the communication with the Federal army in Tennessee cut off. In such a state of things our troops now here would have to find a base beyond the broad sterile mountain which stretches from the Coosa River across our State in a westerly direction. They would be compelled to rest on a line from Tuscaloosa by Jones' Valley to the Coosa, and whenever they struck at the enemy would have to traverse a barren country of over 100 miles, and then enter a valley fertile in soil, it is true, but swept of its provisions by the Federals.

To my kind the evacuation of Corinth was a measure of great benefit to General Johnston's army. It was a submission to the effort of our cavalry here and under General Forrest in West Tennessee to destroy railroad communication with Memphis. The effect wqas eitherk to cause them to give up that district of country or hold it by large garrisons, which would seriously weaken their grand army in Tennessee. Should the evacuation of Middle Tennessee by the effect, our cavalry under Forrest, and that under General Roddey, lining the Tennessee River from Guntersville and Whitesburg on the flank of the enemy all around to Savannah, and on its rear to Reynoldsburg, could cross that stream with 10,000 men (which they will have by the summer), or move eastwardly to flank the enemy in case of an advance to the south, and thus render very material service to your army. The views submitted above have reference to the military importance of this section of country and the inconveniences of its loss. I judge, however, from a clause in your letter to General Roddey, intimating that orders may arrest his march on the way, that you are alive to the considerations I have set forth. It seems to me that General Roddey's force would be more efficient in preventing and overhauling any raid of the enemy south by being judicously posted in North Alabama than south of the Coosa River. Selma is now the greatest point of manufacturing importance in General Johnston's department. The shops in Georgia, since the coal minesabout Chattanooga were occpupied by the enemy, are waning in importance. General Grant, too, has his eye upon Selma. It has not been long since he seduced a large number of workmen from this place. Now, if our cavalry are supposed to be east or south of Gadsden, and North Alabama open to the enemy, or with only one regiment, which would amount to the same thing, in making a raid to destroy our public works in Selma the enemy might cross at Whitesburg and pass down by Blountsville, Elyton, and Montevallo, and b way before it would be known to you, and return by Tuscaloosa, Fayetteville, Pikeville, and along the left bank of Bear Creek to Eastport, where they generally have transports; or they may start from Eastport, the point from which Colonel Streight took his departure, and effect his object with much less interference, provided North Alabama is bare of troops.

The state of things in the mountain, between here and Columbus, is becoming bad, especially in parts of Marion, Walker, and Winston Counties. The tory influence amongst these poor ignorant people is