movement suggested, because the commissary and two quartermasters for wach State report directly at Richmond to the heads of these departments. The quartermasters referred to are, first, the one who is hcarged with the purchase of all grain, &c.; second, the one who procures transportation and artillery horses. He disapproves the details of the plan in the particulars, and for the reasons following, viz: First. He thinks Kingston too far east for the union with Longstreet. The enemy could unite their Knoxville and Chattanooga forces four days sooner than we by keeping the north side of the Tennessee River, and could attak us in detail before our union. Second. It would require more transportation than can be had, or than it would be politic to cumber an army with, to carry our subsistence and other stores to that point. Third. He does not think the army could subsist itself till it should get far west or north of Sparta. The country has been exhausted by the enemy, and did not abound even while we held McMinnville and Tullahoma. Fourth. A battle fought on the proposed route on the north side of the Tennessee would make victory to us indispensable as the only way of avoiding the other alternative of utter destruction or loss of our army. Fifth. The re-enforcements shoudl assemble at once, instead of awaiting the other preparations, so as to prepare to resist an attack in force on us here. They can be easily subsisted here.

He inclines to think that a battle should be sought farther west and on this side of the Tennessee River; that Longstreet should first return here with his forces, leaving William E. Jones' cavalry to operate east and north of Knoxville in cutting off supplies, preventing foraging, &c. Let this army be still further strenghrened, as proposed, and then a part of it thrown into East Tennessee, near Chattanooga, and far enough in advance to cut the communication with Knoxville and Chattanooga, and virtually isolate the former. Let the part thus thrown forward into East Tennessee be near enough to the main body for them to unite in the event of a battle; and let our communications with Dalton be still kept open, so that we may continue to draw our suppies from south, as now. We will thus hold the enemy at Chattanooga in observation and isolate Knoxville at the same time, thus forcing an engagement to relieve the latter, while at same time our subsistence is divided, as heretofore, and the road to Atlanta protected. Shuld we meet with disaster, we can but fall back along our present line to the rear; but should we beat them, we can then (being already previously prepared to do so) follow them into Middle Tennessee. The enemy, if beaten, will have the further disadvantage of the river in his rear. He thinks that, if it be determined to gofirst into Middle Tennessee at all hazards, it would be best to cross the river in Noth Alabama, advancing by way of Rome, Gadsden, &c. The road is less mountainous; supplies will be sooner reached, and the distnace is less over which we would have to haul subsistence-say from Gadsden to Decatur, about seventy six-miles. He thinks that before we can get ready for a forward move Grant will take the initiative in large force and attack us here or near by, which would be decidedly to our advantage. Hence the necessity of the re-enforcements proposed being sent up here at once, without waiting for the other preliminary preparations to be made first. He can exhibit his whole force in front of us before we can bring up the re-enforcements from P[olk] and B[eauregard]. But whether the movement in either direction be made, or interrupted by an attack from the enemy, the preparations for moving should go on just the same. If victorious, we will need them so as to follow up promptly.

John B. SALE.