Vicksburg, you will, in absence of other orders, move on the enemy's rear. I give these directions believing, as I do, thatk Ferguson's and Adam's brigades are sufficient successfully to cope with any mere cavalry raid the enemy may make. I will probably be at your headquarters in the course of to-morrow. This is sent in duplicate, the signal having been taken by courier on wrong road.

Yours, respectfully,

S. D. LEE,

Major-General.

[32.]

DALTON, March 22, 1864.

Colonel B. S. EWELL:

DEAR COLONEL: I received your kind letter through Colonel Harvie. Had it contianed the news of restored health and vigor it would have been a letter of unmixed satisfaction to me. Accept my thannks for your very flattering expressions, and my best hopes that we may yet serve in the same army and both under our present general. Some time since I thought that Grant would take the Army of Virginia. To lead that army successfully would place any Northern general on a foundation from which no after failure would easily remove him; indeed, the capture of Richmond made, he could rest quietly, repose on his laurels, and attempt the fickled goddess no more. To make success there possible Grant could command all the forces of the Union as he does command by virtue of past success the confidence of its armies. When he was reported as returned to Nashville I was omething shaken, but not so convinced as the general that this would be his theater. I told him last night that he had time to spare, and his presence here might be for the double purpose of arrangmeent with Thomas and to hasten the contingent from this army that would necessarily go to Virginia. The telegrams of this morning give some color to this supposition; but the only thing that is certain is that Grant will take the offensive here or in Virginia, and that the mass of our enemies will be underhis horse-tails. If he goes to Virginia Thomas, I think, will still advance to prevent our detaching, and from the reports not to be doubted of the recruiting of his corps, his present organization will give him a far larger force than ours, and we will receive nothing. If, on the other hand, Grant remains, Sherman will be with him in a few days and the united army be ready to advance, while at Richmond they are yet undecided to re-enforce us. Telegraph to-day says no troops can be sent us unless we have decided to advance. This in answer to General Johnston's request to send on the troops; that he thought Grant would make what haste he could; move on us first; that if he drove us back the question of our advance was settled against us; but if we received the troops and met his advance with a victory, we could then strike home and go where it seemed best. They have now a scheme to strike home and go where it seemed best. They have now a scheme to send Longstreet and Beauregard into Kentucky, and this would do very well if we had men to spare for diversion (not techinal). I am wrong in saying "they have." Longstreet has proposed and they are debating such a scheme.

I have given all the thought I am capable of to the condition of affairs, and am more fixed in my judgment than even the general, who made the proposition, viz, send all the troops that can possibly be spared, and to make this army the best possible. If the enemy advance and we beat tham, so much the better; it is easier for us to beat them near our base, and as much better as easier. If they don't advance, it