seems unlimited. From what I can gather form many sources I doubt wheer existed which felt a more entire or implicit confidence in its leader. So far as I can learn this is the feeling as well with the rank and file as with the officers of all grades. So much for the state of feeling in the army and among the people. The prevailing opinion, both in and out of the army, seems to be that all that is needed to secure a successful termination of the campaign is a sufficient cavalry force operating in Sherman's rear and destroying his line of communications.

I learn from gentlemen just from the army who have seen and conversed with General Johnston That the opinion of the latter is that, if he were supplied with such a cavalry force, Sherman's army would not only be forced to retreat, but that it would be destroyed-so completely destroyed as to insure to us the immediate recovery of Tennessee and Kentucky. At present the only cavalry attached to Johnston's army is that under Wheeler, which, as I am told, does not number more than 6,000 or 7,000 and all of which is necessary to protect his flanks. The consequence is that Sehrman's communications are left comparatively undisurbed. Should Johnston be forced to fall back still farther south, or even to given up Atlanta, that result (unless there should be a great change of opinion and feeling in the army and among the people) will be attributed to the fact that the cavalry force connected with his army is inadequate to the double duty of protecting his flanks and destroying the enemy's communication. Universal surprise is felt that immediately after Forrest's brilliant success over Strugis, his, with the rest of the cavalry in Lee's department, was not sent to Sherman's rear. No one doubts that Forrest, with 10,000 men, or even less, would effectually destroy the road in Sherman's rear south of Dalton. Is it even yet too late for such a movement? I know it is said that a formidable expedition is about leaving Memphis for Mississippi or Central Alabama. Supposing that to be true, would not all the injury which such an wxpedition, if unresisted, would inflict upon the country be more than counterbalanced by the results which would certainly follow the effectual destruction of the lines of communication in Sehman's rear? It seems to me they weold be. Send Forrest, with the principal part of Lee's cavalry, to the rear of Sherman, and in a few days he would effectually destroy the railroad, and so obstruct the other roads that it would be impossible for Shrman to save his army by a retreat. The destruction of Sherman's army would more than compensate for all the mischief which a raid on a large scale would inflict upon us elsewhere.

With great respect, yours, &c.,

R. W. WALKER.

[38.]

MACON, MISS., July 5, 1864.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS:

Proclamationmen able to bear arms for thirty days to assemble at Brandon and Artesia. Am in correspondence with Lee and Forrest. Enemy will be driven back, but will do some damage to the railroad. Think they will not pass Jackson. No enemy yet in North Mississippi.

CHAS. CLARK,

Governor.

[39.]