MONTGOMERY, July 15, 1864.

General B. BRAGG:

I have not a regiment under my command. Every company ready for service has been forwarded or ordered to General Maury by order of the President. Companies not actually en route to General Maury are scattered through the limits of the State. There are eight companies of cavalry attached to Conscript Bureau as a supporting force which might be made available.

J. M. WITHERS,

Major-General.

[39.]

General BRAGG,

Montgomery:

Without orders I was moving my command to this place. Here I met orders from Lieutenant-General Lee to dismount my men and take them by railroad and boat to Montgomery and West Point. I will move with my command by first boat from this place on their arrival some time to-night. Intelligence just received states that enemy has diverged from Wetumpka road toward Opelika.

GID. J. PILLOW,

Brigadier-General.

[38.]

SELMA, July 17, 1864.

(Received at Montgomery 17th.)

General B. BRAGG:

Late New Orleans accounts say that Canby has transportation for 30,000 troops. There is known to be little force there. This transportation is intended to be thrown into the Chattahoochee River to bring out the Andersonville prisoners. That is the object of Rousseau's movement. My judgment is that there is where your attention should be turned. My train is at Motevallo, fifty-five miles from here; my horses and men at Plantersville, twenty-two miles from here. On the south side of which river, Coosa or Alabama, do you wish me to move them? My men and artillery will goup by boat from this place. I leave here on train at 6 o'clock. Please answer.

GID. J. PILLOW.

[38.]

SELMA, July 17, 1864.

General B. BRAGG:

The enemy has done comparatively no damage to the country through which he has passed, but kept directly ahead. My conviction is that the movement is against Andersonville, Ga. Shall I move my horses and train across the country?

GID. J. PILLOW,

Brigadier-General.

[38.]

ATLANTA, July 18, 1864.

President JEFFERSON DAVIS:

The enemy being now in our immediate front and making, as we suppose, a general advance, we deem it dangerous to change commanders, now especially, as this would necessitate other important changes.