a movement against Jonesborough. I accordingly ordered Hardee's and Lee's corps to that place, the former in command, with instructions to attack the enemy in that quarter with the utmost celerity and energy. The militia and Stewart's corps were retained for the defense of Atlanta. I confidently counted upon the defeat of the enemy at Jonesborough, in which case I intended to move upon him and cut him off from the river, or to operate upon his communications as I should find best. There was a great deal of delay in getting into position to attack the enemy at Jonesborough. The enemy had constructed temporary breastworks. An assault was made by both corps at 2 p. M. on the 31st. The attack failed and the whole affair proved entirely fruitless, and my expectations, which I still believe entirely just, were terribly disappointed. I can with justice blame no one with this failure. It seems the troops had been solong confined to trenches and had been taught to believe that intrenchments cannot be taken, so that they attacked without spirit and retired without proper effort. This failure made it absolutely necessary for me to retire from Atlanta. In anticipation of such a possible necessity I had directed the removal of all stores and public property at the same time that I directed the movement upon Jonesborough. This was not done in consequence of the utter neglect of the chief quartermaster. The greatest attention was given the matter, and every assurance given by the quartermaster that the matter was attended to, but when the facts were ascertained several trains of cars were found to be still in Atlanta. Exertions were made at once to remove them, but when the road was cut by the enemy at Rough and Ready a train of ordnance stores and a considerable amount of rolling-stock still reMained. This I regret very much, especially as it arose from no necessity, but from the lack of attention to the matter on the part of the officer immediately charged with this duty. The ordnance stores were destroyed and I retired without interruption. Hardee's and Stewart's corps are in position at this point. Lee's corps is near McDonough. The militia is ordered to Griffin. I am officially informed that there is a tacit of not expressed determination among the men of this army, extenting to officers as high in some instances as colonel, that they will not attack breast-works. In this state of affairs I think my troops, for offensive operations, not more than equal to their own numbers of the enemy. The enemy can thus hold me in check with a part of his force, and is at liberty to detach strong parties to operate upon my communications and upon such points as Augusta, Columbus, Andersonville, &c. To save this country from being overrun it is necessary to crush Sherman. To accomplish this re-enforcements should be sent me immediately. Should the enemy move to the eeast or west I shall fall upon his flank and rear with all my force. I shall use every effort to induce our men to believe that they can carry the enemy's hastily prepared works.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD,

General.

[38.]

RICHMOND, VA., September 4, 1864.

Major General D. H. MAURY,

Meridian, Miss.:

Your dispatch of the 3rd received. My suggestion in reference to General Forrest was based on the state of affairs at the time as under-