annals of the Confederacy of the suggestion of a doubt on the right of the President to make such call and the obligation of compliance by the State Executive. During the last war with Great Britain a question of the kind was made by the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut with the President of the then United States. They claimed to decide whether the exigencies existed which authorized the President to make a requisition for militia to repel invasions, and denied his power to associate them with other troops under a Federal officer. They affected to believe the exercise of such a power imperiled State rights and promoted personal ambition. The judicial tribunals determined adversely to the pretentions of these Governors, and the country did not fail to discover lurking under their specious pretenses hostility scarcely less than criminal to the constituted authorities of the Union, and unlicensed ambition in themselves, and a dangerous purpose, in the midst of war, to cripple patriotic efforts for the public defense. The impression was not wanting, either then or since, that they were even in communication with the enemy, or at least proposed to give them encouragement and moral support. Without imputing to you such designs, I cannot repress apprehensions of similar effects from your analogous course under the presenrcustances, as indeed it must be admitted in all particulars, and especially on the main point of the existence of invasion, there was more plausibility in their case than in yours on the grounds assigned for refusal.

On analyzing Your Excellency's letter, it is apparent that the prominent and influencing reasons of your action spring from a spirit of opposition to the Government of the Confederate States and animosity to the Chief Magistrate whom the people of the Confederacy have honored by their choice and confidence. Your reasons may be reduced to the following: First. That the campaign in Georgia not having been controlled by the President according to your concemptions or with the means you advised, you will not permit any force you can control to be subject to his disposition, but will yourself retain their control, and mete out your assistance according to your views of policy and State interest. Second. That you suspect the President of a design after the reception of these militia of disorganize or disband them that he may displace the officers commanding them and substitute his partisans and favorites. Third. You apprehend that these militia under the President's control will be employed for such length of time and under such condition as will be deleterious to the interests of themselves and the State, and esteem yourself a better judge on these points, especially as to when and where they shall be employed, furloughed, or discharged, &c. Fourth. That these troops, besides being necessary as a defense against invasion, are also necessary to defend the State against usurpations of power, and as "a protection against the encroachment of centralized power," and that the knowledge of the President of their ability and disposition to do this was the motive for the call on you.

In reference to the first, it might not be safe, as it would not be expedient now, to expose the circumstances of the present campaign, the councils that guided, or the resources that have been or could be commandtions. None should have known more certainly than Your Excellency the zeal and energy with which the President and this Department, under his auspices, have striven to command resources and means for the defense of Georgia and the overthrow of the invader, nor the impediments and difficulties often, unfortunately, resulting from the obstruction of the local authorities which they had to encounter. Aware early of the danger that menaced the State, besides concentrating troops from other departments for its defense, this