enlist in Confederate service, which would give the President the entire command of them and enable him to destroy the militia organization of the State. Fortunately the temptation succeeded in seducing but a small portion of the militia to desert and return home. They were generally true men and stood gallantry by their colors, knowing that their country needed their services at the front and not in local companies in the rear. General Orders, Numbers 63, was issued on the 6th of August and was followed by General Orders, Numbers 67, on the 16th of the same month. The President then waited two weeks, and, as the militia still remained in the trenches around Atlanta, he found it necessary to change his policy and resort to a requisition upon me for the whole militia of the State as the only means left of accomplishing his objects.

President Madison offered no such inducements to and made no such requisition upon the militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut. So much for the analogy of the two cases. But you are as unfortunate in your facts as in your analogy, as will be further seen by your statement that the "judicial tribunals determined adversely to the pretentions of the Governors." By reference to the eight volume Massachusetts Reports, Supplement, PAGE 549, you will find that he judges of the supreme court of that State had the case before them, and determined every point made by Governor Strong in his favor, and "adversely to the pretentions" of the President. But you remind me that the 10,000 militia which you say I had organized, with those I was proceeding to organize, if incorporated with the veteran regiments prior to the 1st of May, would have been an invaluable acquisition to the Army of Tennessee, and not improbably have hurled back the invaders from the treshold of my State. If this were true, and the movements and strength of the enemy were so much better understood by the President than by myself, as you would have the country believe, why was it that the Presidefor the militia in May, when the armies were above Dalton? Why was the call delayed till the 30th of August, two days before Atlanta fell, and then mailed to me too late to reach Milledgeville till after the fall? If the control of the whole militia of the State by the President was so essential to the defense of Atlanta, how do you account for the neglect of the President to call for them till after the campaign had ended in the surrender of the city to the enemy? Seeing that the President did not seem to appreciate the emergency and the danger to Atlanta, upon consultation with that far-seeing general dnd distinguished soldier, Joseph E. Johnston, I had ordered the militia to report to him and aid the gallant Army of Tennessee. I first ordered out the civil and military officers of the State when the armies were near Dalton, and afterward called out the reserved militia, including all between sixteen and fifty-five years of age, when they were at Kenesaw. During all this time, and for nearly two months afterward, no call was make are correct, surely such neglect by the President in so ciritcal an emergency involves little less than criminality.

Again, you state, as one of the inducements to the call, that I had stated in official correspondence that I had 10,000 militia organized; that a portion of these were known to be with the Army of Tennessee in some auxiliary relation - only a limited number, however, not believed to consitute half the number reported by me to be actually organized. You are again incorrect in your facts, and, unfortunately, ignorant of the strength of the force that was under your command. In the official correspondence to which I suppose you allude I did not state that