subsisted and paid as well as any other division under his command? There is just as much reason for saying that a division of Georgians under General Lee should not be subsisted and paid by the Confederacy while under his command, as that this division under General Hood should not be subsisted and paid while he commanded them. The truth at the bottom of all this is so visible that it cannot be concealed even by an attempt to muddy the water. I find the statement emphasized by you that the Constitution of the Confederate States does not confer on the States the power to keep troops in time of war. As the States were sovereign and possessed all power when they formed the Constitution which gave life to the Confederate Government neither that Government nor the Constitution could confer any power on the States. They retained all that they did not confer upon it. But admit your statemenws? You were obliged to admit in the next sentence that the States did reserve that power. Having reserved it they are certainly authorized to exercise it. As you admit they not only reserved the power, but the reservation naturally includes whatever is necessary to accomplish the object of it. But you then attempt to explain it away be denying that the reservation means anything and, in effect, contend that the Confederate Government may take from the State the last one of the troops which she has reserved the power to keep without violating the reserved rights of the State. In other words the State has plainly reserved the right to keep troops in time of war when actually invaded, but this right you, in effect, say is subordinate to the will of the President, who may take the last one of them from her whenever he chooses to do so.

According to your mode of reasoning, if a State or an individual delegates certain powers to an agent and reserves certain other powers, the reserved powers are limited by an subordinate to the delegated powers and may be entirely destroyed by them when, in the opinion of the agent, this is necessary to enable him to execute to their fullest extent the delegated powers. In other words, the reserved powers are to be construed strictly, and the delegated powers liberally, and the reserved are to yield to the delegated whenever there is apparent conflict. I confess I had not understood this to be the doctrine of the State rights, or Jeffersonian school. I had been taught that the delegated powers are to be construed strictly, and in case of a delegation of powers, with certain reservations, that the delegated powers are limited and controlled by the reserved powers. This well established rule is repudiated by you when it conflicts with the purposes of the Confederate Administration, and you claim that the power reserved by the States to keep troops in time of war, when actually invaded, simply means that they may keep them tillt he Confederate Executive chooses to call last one of them out of their control. To justify all this you are driven to the usual plea of necessity. You say it was necessary that the whole militia of Georgia should be in Confederate service and subject, not to my judgment or disposal, but to the control of the constitutional commander-in-chief.

I deny that the President is or ever can be, without the consent of the State, the constitutional commander-in-chief of the whole militia of the State. When we take the whole context together the Constitution is plain upon this point. He is declared to be the commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the Confederate States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the Confederate States. Congress has power to provide for calling forth