MONTGOMERY, ALA., November 28, 1864.

Major General D. H. MAURY,

Mobile, Ala.:

Armistead's brigade will leave in morning by rail for Pollard.*

GEO. WM. BRENT,

Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[45.]

HDQRS. CENTRAL AND NORTHERN DIVISION OF ALABAMA.+

Major General D. H. MAURY,
Commanding Department, Meridian, Miss.:

GENERAL: I received your dispatch this evening saying you wished me to send the reserve forces at Opelika to Pollard as soon as they could be spared. Under present circumstances and the probable future they cannot be spared. On the contrary I deem it my duty to say to you that the forces now at my command are wholly inadequate to defend North Alabama from any movement in force by raid or otherwise which the enemy may make. Clanton's command, reserves and all, would not turn out over 600 men in an emergency. It is stationed at Blue Mountain and Oxford with detached scouting parties to the right, left, and front of that position (if he has obeyed orders). Armistead's command (formerly Pillow's) would not turn out over 800, if that many. It is stationed now at or near Opelika, which is ninety miles from Oxford or Blue Mountain, with pickets and scouts to the front, right, and left, or so ordered. Colonel Cole (heretofore commanding at Opelika) reports three companies of mounted and two companies of infantry reserves newly organized and inefficient, and available for duty only about 300 men, making a sum total of 1,700 men move, to concentrate to the right or left, and in such a contingency leaving the front they move from uncovered with nothing between it and the enemy, which is the present position since General Hoods' withdrawal from Atlanta of the entire command. To the rear of this force I have no reserves whatever.

General Roddey, as you are apprised, is under special orders. I have sent him your order to report to me, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to unite promptly with the other forces, if ordered. But, as you know, he is in the extreme northwestern portion of the State, under raiding orders, and so remote and uncertain as to his whereabouts that no dependence in an emergency could be placed upon his command. Since receipt of yourd him to send me returns, but have received none. From what I can learn it is a fluctuating force - it may be 1,500 one week and 1,000 the next, without casualties from battle. You doubtless know something of the material and character of the other commands - Clanton's and Armistead's - without much organization, discipline, or efficiency, principally new and untried. So looking at the map, the situation, the extent of country, its value in material resources and lines of communication, I think you will agree with me, as your dispatch of yesterday indicates, that I absolutely require re-enforcements, and promptly. I know you appreciate the importance of it and will pardon me for calling your attention to this, in my opinion, very important matter. I can, as you see, sympathize with you in your position as commander of a large and valuable

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*This is reply to Maury, VOL. XLV, Part I, p. 1256.

+Without date, but probably written in the latter part of November, 1864.

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