sippi for the campaign in Northern Georgia during the summer of 1864, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta:

On the 20th of March, 1864, the date of my appointment as chief of artillery of your army, the field artillery of the four separate armies, which at that time composed your command, consisted of 16,250 men (effective), 530 guns, 4,300 horses, and 987 mules. The proportion of artillery to the aggregate infantry and cavalry force was about three guns to 1,000 men. The guns were of varied patterns, twelve different calibers being at that time in actual use. The severity of the campaigns of the previous autumn and winter had also reduced the number of draft animals much below what was necessary.

Believing that the character of the country and of your proposed operations, as well as the veteran condition of your troops, would justify a material reduction in the number of guns, and convinced that efficiency and facility of service and supply demanded a reduction of the number of calibers, I submitted both questions to your consideration. You approved of my recommendation that the proportion of artillery to the other two arms should not exceed two guns per 1,000 men, and that the number of calibers should be reduced to four. Immediate measures were taken to carry out these views. Horses and mules in sufficient numbers were provided and distribute; the proportion of artillery was reduced to rather less than two guns per 1,000 men, and all the odd or unnecessary calibers were eliminated by being either turned into arsenals or placed in the depots or other fortified posts in our rear, where they were used as guns of position.

Written instructions and printed general orders were prepared and issued, the latter in such numbers that every officer and sergeant was supplied with a copy, and by the 1st of May, when the campaign commenced, the field artillery of your armies, in equipment, outfit, and general supply and condition, was well provided, and in all respects ready for the rough and active service to which it was subsequently subjected.

To Brigadier-General Brannan, Colonel Taylor, and Brigadier-General Tillson (the latter succeeded about the commencement of the campaign by Lieutenant-General Schofield), the respective chiefs of artillery of the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, much credit is due for the intelligence, energy, and zeal displayed in perfecting the preparatory arrangements and in the work of re-organizing and refitting their field batteries generally. Brigadier-General Brannan had nearly completed his share of the labor when I entered upon my duties.

The entire artillery force that took the field the active portion of your forces in Northern Georgia, on the 5th of May, 1864, was as follows:

Army. Batteries. Officers. Men. Guns. Horses.

Army of the 24 84 3,120 130 2,380

Cumberland

Army of the 19 60 2,215 96 1,758

Tennessee

Army of the 7 23 790 28 530

Ohio

Total 50 167 6,125 254 4,668

These batteries were efficiently horsed and well supplied with caissons, battery wagons, and traveling forges, and rarely had at any