The amount of ammunition furnished both field and siege guns was always abundant, and it was generally supplied in serviceable condition and of the best description. Experience teaches that Parrott ammunition is the most suitable for Parrott guns, and Schenkl and Hotchkiss for the 3-inch and 4 1/2-inch, and also that the Schenkl case-shot, with combination fuse, and the Hotchkiss fuse-shell, are at present the most effective projectiles of their class for rifled guns.

The nature of military operations in a country like ours is peculiar, and often without precedent elsewhere. It is generally unfavorable to the full development and legitimate use of artillery. This is eminently the case in the West, where large tracts of uncleared land and dense forest materially circumscribe its field of usefulness and often force it into positions of hazard and risk. The services of the artillery throughout the whole campaign have been conspicuous. The western life of officers and men, favorable to self-reliance, coolness, endurance, and marksmanship, seems to adapt them peculiarly for his special arm. Their three years' experience in the field adds important elements to their efficiency and has combined to render the artillery of your command unusually reliable and effective. At Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Kenesaw, and amid the varied and bloody operations before Atlanta, it sustained it appropriate share of the work most creditable. Its practice at Rocky Face Ridge and Kenesaw Mountain, where at unusual elevation it was called upon to silence or dislodge the enemy, was extraordinary. Abundant proof of this was obtained from personal inspection of the enemy's works after we gained possession of them, which proof is fully confirmed by the concurrent acknowledgment of the enemy.

The peculiar nature of the campaign and the gallantry of the artillery officers are alike illustrated by the fact that three division chiefs of artillery were killed, and the chief of artillery of the Army of the Tennessee seriously wounded by the rifles of rebel sharpshooters while they were engaged in the duty of selecting suitable positions for their batteries.

Posted as many batteries frequently and necessarily were in unusually exposed positions, and not unfrequently upon the actual skirmish line, the guns were always served with steadiness and effect, and in no instance, except in the battle of July 22 and the cavalry raids of Stoneman and McCook, on which occasion there were special exculpatory reasons, were guns abandoned or the enemy suffered to make captures. A manifest improvement was observable throughout in the use and selection of projectiles and in the judicious expenditure of ammunition.

The separate reports of battery commanders and of the division, corps, and army chiefs of artillery, which are laid before you, give the more minute details of the service of the artillery as well as the names of individuals who rendered themselves conspicuous for courage and conduct.

I beg respectfully to indorse the recommendations for the reward of individuals and to add thereto the names of Brigadier-General Brannan, Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield, and Captain Hickenlooper, the officers who have throughout the campaign performed the duties of chiefs of artillery of the three armies fidelity, energy, and efficiency that entitle them to official commendation.

The officers of my staff, Captain Marshall, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Merritt and Lieutenant Verplanck, aides-de-camp, were always active and zealous, and carried my orders, frequently