involved a general engagement, or a retreat of the enemy, and I determined, therefore, to push forward my troops to that point in column, and deploy for action. Resuming the advance, Carlin was ordered to move forward with the remainder of his division, and to form on the left of his Second Brigade, already in position. Morgan was ordered to move rapidly by the main road, and, after crossing the creek at Chambers' Mill, to move to the left and take position on Carlin's right on the ridge-in taking position, to be guarded by the natural advantages of the ground. Baird moving forward, closed upon Carlin's left in reserve. These movements were promptly executed, notwithstanding the rough nature of the ground and the fire of artillery from the enemy's works, to which morgan's division was frequently subjected. By this time Prescott's battery had taken a good position on the ridge, and opened an exceedingly well-directed fire upon the enemy's works. In this he was soon followed by Gardner, and a general artillery fight ensued, which, as results showed afterward, was exceedingly complimentary to our artillerists. General Stanley's corps was reported as having arrived, and was taking position on my left, his right resting on the railroad. The ridge upon which my troops was now concentrated was, in its main direction, nearly east and west, and faced nearly parallel with that part of the enemy's line of works, which was refused and formed his right, his main works running in general direction north east, and southwest, as shown by the accompanying map.* From information believed to be reliable, I was satisfied the enemy's works had not been extended to the railroad at a late hour in the forenoon, and that a well-directed attack would rout this part of his lines and turn his position completely. Morgan's division, and the two brigades of Carlin's, were to form the attacking forces, and were deployed in two lines as near continuous to each other as the rough and difficult ground over which the advance had to be made would permit. One brigade, of Baird's division, was deployed in rear of Carlin's left, in close support. The distance to be passed in front of Morgan's, where the enemy's works could be seen, was about 1,000 yards. Where the enemy might be found in Carlin's front, owing to the dense thicket before him, could not be determined without an advance, which I ordered about 4 p. m. The troops moved promptly, but owing to the thick undergrowth of brush in Carlin's front, swampy ground and ditches in Morgan's, the troops necessarily moved slow, and with great difficulty observed alignment and direction. These obstacles were as speedily overcome as could be expected, and the whole line advanced to the slope of the hill, in the open field, within from 300 to 400 yards of the enemy's position. Here the ground offered some protection to the troops, and a momentary halt was made, and the lines rectified. Up to this point the effect of the enemy's fire had been but lightly felt, generally along the line, except by Edie's brigade, which was some distance in advance of the general line, and had struck a projecting flank of the enemy's works, charged, and carried it, with considerable loss. The position thus gallantly gained was only partially held, owing tot he impossibility of supports getting up in time. Este's brigade, of Baird's division, was ordered to report to General Carlin as a support to this part of the line and was promptly placed in position so as to relieve this brigade in the following attack. The other two brigades of Baird's division were held close in reserve in rear of the left of the corps,

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*Not found.

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