General Davis having driven the enemy out of Tunnel Hill and within their works at Buzzard Roost Pass, I advanced my line, swinging to the left to conform to the movement of Davis' troops, and again formed line of battle as before, upon his right, my right brigade covering the Trickum road, near Widow Rogers' house. In this position my troops bivouacked for the night, strong pickets being thrown out to a considerable distance on all the roads in the direction of Trickum and Villanow. The 8th was occupied in maneuvering in front of Buzzard Roost, my final position big with my left resting near the high knob, known to us as Signal Hill, and my line stretching southwardly, so as to command and practically close up all roads leading out of Buzzard Roost Gap to the west and southwest. Toward evening I caused a section to be placed in position on the ridge which terminated the open field to the westward of the gap, and opened upon a line of the enemy's works beyond the pass. This, with the advance of part of General Davis' division and part of Wood's brigade, of Butterfield's division, tot he ridge beyond the field, developed two batteries of determined strength, one upon the point of Chattoogata Mountain, to our right, the other in the rear of the pass, to our left, evidently in the enemy's main line. Early on the morning of the 9th I advanced Carlin's brigade across Mill Creek to relieve some of the regiments of Wood's brigade, which had been thrown in there on the evening previous, and was occupying the ground at the base of Chattoogata Mountain. About 11 a. m. I was, by direction of Major-General Palmer (he having gone to his headquarters in the rear sick), at department headquarters, to receive instructions, and heard it reported to Major-General Thomas, by an officer of General Wood's staff, that the troops of that command had felt all along Chattoogata; that they found but a small force there, and that in the judgment of this officer, it would not be difficult to carry the crest of the mountain by assault. To verify the report of this officer, I was instructed to advance Carlin's brigade, so as, if possible, to clear the mountain to its top, supporting him with another brigade; this was accordingly done. Carlin, with a strong but well-extended skirmish line, seized the long, isolated ridge, which, lying south of the railroad, almost closes up the westerly mouth of the gap, and swept the mountain of the enemy's skirmishers clear to the foot of the abrupt palisade which crowns the slope. In the hope that some path might be found at which we could force our way, relying confidently on the tried troops of Carlin's brigade, to advance wherever footing could be found, I ordered my reserve brigade (General King's) across Mill Creek, to within close supporting distance. A careful reconnaissance by General Carlin all along his line, and to a considerable distance below his right, disclosed no practicable footway to the crest of the ridge. An attempt to jump round the nose of the mountain, so as to ascend from the reverse side, which was supposed to be less abrupt, developed a heavy force of infantry and artillery, strongly intrenched, in our front, upon the line by which we must at first advance, and so posted as to enfilade us wherever we should wheel to ascend the mountain. To have assaulted this position would have brought my command within the fire of nearly the whole of the enemy's artillery, and that of perhaps a superior force of infantry, without the possibility of receiving adequate support. To attempt to carry the mountain without first clearing this position would have been hopeless; accordingly, after a stubborn and well-pressed attack, by a strong line of skirmishers from some of Carlin's and Scribner's regiments, had