first to reach the timber in which the main action took place, and soon became warmly engaged, the enemy advancing upon us. As quickly as possible I moved forward what was left of my first line to the support of the skirmishers and drove the enemy back, at the same time advancing my second line to the position left by the first. I now prepared to advance into the woods in front of us to assault the enemy's main works, and was just going over the first line of works, when I was directed by Captain Edmonds, of the division staff, to wait until the Second Brigade came up. This I did and moved into the woods with them. A considerable gap had been opened between the two brigades in the previous movement. My line moved forward as rapidly as it was possible to move, in a dense thicket, under a heavy fire of musketry, canister, and spherical case, at short range, and a cross-fire from one of General Morgan's batteries, for about 100 yards. Here my right struck the enemy's works, which formed an angle of about forty degrees with my line of battle, and my center and left an abatis. My lines were exposed to an enfilading fire from the right, a cross-fire from the left, and a very hot fire of musketry and artillery in front. It was impossible to charge, owing to the obstructive in the way. After fighting stubbornly for a considerable length of time, under all these disadvantages, my right have away gradually and fell back in good order and by order of the regimental commander, and was followed by the balance, after holding its position a few minutes longer. In this there was no panic, the men all stopping at the margin of the woods. Two of the regiments, the Seventy-fourth Ohio and First Wisconsin, claimed to be out of ammunition. I had already sent for a supply, but it had not come up. I now put the Thirty-eighth Indiana in the first line with the Twenty-first, Sixty-ninth, and a part of the Seventy-fourth Ohio, thus strengthening and somewhat extending it, and advanced again, directing the second to follow supporting the first. In this assault we carried the works very handsomely, crossed them with the right, made a partial change of front to the left, and followed them up across the railroad nearly or quite 200 yards, taking a large number of prisoners. As we advanced the battery moved down the road at double-quick about 400 yards, and opened upon us again. This we would have captured, had it been possible to have made a charge. In following their works to the left, we were obliged to drive the rebels from their traverses which they had built at intervals of a few steps to protect them from the fire of General Morgan's artillery. Our own front was now clear as well as 200 yards of General Stanley's, but still the brigade sent by him to our left failed to come up. Upon our halting, the enemy massed against my left flank, and after holding the position for some time under a destructive fire, the troops on the left of the road were withdrawn to our original line at the edge of the field, two regiments holding the works in our own proper front. These the enemy did not attempt to recover. We held the ground during the night, constructing defenses both at the border of the field and at the front. I have ascertained, beyond a question, that 123 prisoners were taken and sent to the rear by my command. These were sent across from our right in the direction of Colonel Este's and General Morgan's commands to avoid the fire to which they would have been exposed in going to our rear. Some other prisoners were sent through my lines when men could not be spared to take charge of them. Of the number I can make no reliable estimate. In this