and that a heavy artillery fire is sweeping down our advance. 9.30 a. m., Colonel Bradley, in command of Harker's brigade, sends word by Colonel Opdycke that General H[arker] has just been mortally wounded, shot from his horse, while he was within fifteen paces of the enemy's works, and that the brigade cannot move any farther, though he is trying to work his way up; that he is on the same hill that the enemy's works are on, but the head of his column is all smashed up and disorganized. 9.40 a. m., Colonel Opdycke reports that the head of Wagner's brigade is broken up; that the brigade is within a few feet of the enemy's works, and that a well-organized column could be led through it over the enemy's works. General Newton at once sent word to General Kimball to oblique his brigade to the rear of Wagner's, and to rush it right through. 9.50 a. m., reported to General Thomas that in this first assault we failed to carry the works. 10.07 a. m., received orders from Major-General Thomas to make another attack. Kimball is preparing for it. 10.25 a. m., Colonel Bradley reports a large force of the enemy moving to our left. 10.30, Kimball made as assault; got up to the enemy's works, but as he had no support was obliged to fall back. 10.40, ordered Wood to keep Hazen's brigade to the left of the ravine and to move Knefler's brigade (now in Newton's works) to the rear line of works, to be ready to move over to the left. Wood was instructed to look well to the left of the ravine for any attack that may be made there. 11 a. m., our troops have fallen back to the position they held this a. m., but our skirmish line holds the skirmish rifle-pits that we took from the enemy. 11.30, sent staff officer to report results to General Thomas. 11.35, General Thomas sent word to general Howard that General Davis thought that he could take the enemy's works on his left, and he had sent a reconnoitering party to see whether it could be done. If it could, the attack would be made, and General H[oward] must support General D[avis] with the forces on our right. He also wished a main line established, with works, where our picket-line now is, if possible. 1 p. m., it was decided not to make another assault. 1.45 p. m., received word from General Thomas asking General H[oward] whether there is any point of the enemy's works in our front that can be assaulted this afternoon with any show of success. 2 p. m., sent note to division commanders asking them whether, in their opinion, any part of the enemy's works in their fronts could be carried by an assault this afternoon; they first to examine the same as well as they could. 2.40 p. m., General H[oward] sent communication to General Thomas informing him that he knew of no more favorable points of approach to the enemy's lines than the point assaulted by General Newton this a. m.; that the enemy's works in our front, so carefully prepared and flanked, can only be carried with great difficulty. 3.30 p. m., received notes from division commanders: First, General Stanley reported that upon a personal examination of the line and reports of intelligent men who saw the enemy's works, he is satisfied that the chances are against a successful assault in his front; second, General newton reports that from his personal observation and reports of officers on the skirmish line, he considers it impossible to successfully assault the works in his front; third, General Wood gives reasons why an attack should not be made in his front. (See report.) 9 p. m., received note from General Stanley, stating that the left of Kirby's line was exposed to a constant flank fire, as General Kimball (on Newton's right) was not up with him, and that his position was