are not strong enough, they should be relieved and the bridge burned. At once replied, stating that parts of two regiments are there, and asked whether they should be relieved. 12.30 p. m., received instructions from Major-General Thomas to hold the line we occupy at present and not to withdraw to the new and interior lines we have constructed. At once sent word to division commanders not to move until further orders. Also sent word to General Garrard, who is on our left, that General Thomas doesn't wish him to withdraw his cavalry until further orders. 10 p. m., received dispatch from Major-General Sherman, sent to General Stanely, stating that orders have just been received from Washington assigning him to the command of Fourth Corps. Day clear and very warm. Usual skirmishing and artillery firing. But very few casualties.

August 3.-8.30 a. m., General Stanley sent a dispatch to general Thomas stating that he would make a reconnaissance this morning, and would push out his skirmish line and attack the enemy' picket line, and asked for his opinion. No answer received. Later in the morning, after riding along the lines and observing the situation, it was thought advisable not to make the reconnaissance. 10.15 a. m., received directions from General Thomas to strip the south end of the bridge at Power's Ferry for the purpose of guarding till. 10.20 a. m., sent directions in accordance with the above-mentioned order to the commanding officer of the guard at Power's Ferry bridge. 10.40, received message from Captain Messenger, at his lookout near Howard's house, stating that the rebels are leaving our front and moving off through Atlanta. Afterward he sent word that the vacated places were filled by other rebel troops. 10.50 a. m., sent Captain Messenger's dispatch to Major-General Sherman. 11 a. m., Major-General Sherman telegraphed General Stanely that our (the Twenty-third and Fourteenth Corps) movements to the right to-day will surely draw the enemy to East Point. He may possibly attack our left, but I (Sherman) think not. Every approachable point to Atlanta should be felt, and make the enemy develop hi force. The extreme silence and absence of artillery firing when the enemy mst see troops moving at Palmer's front are suspicious. I (Sherman) would like to have the skirmishers about Wood and Newton's front push a reconnaissance as far forward as possible, and use considerable artillery about 4 p. m. 12.20 p. m., General Sherman telegraphed General Stanely that Hascall's division, of Schofield's corps, and one of Palmer's divisions will cross Utoy Creek to the east and will threaten the railroad, so that the enemy may weaken Atlanta (the defense of) so far that a bold dash may make a lodgment about Wood's front; at all events make the attempt with a strong skirmish line. 2 p. m. sent dispatch to General Sherman, stating that the report of the signal officer that the rebel troops ere leaving the front of this corps was party incorrect. About one brigade left, and it was replaced by other troops. The enemy's artillery can be seen in our front in position. 3 p. m., received dispatch from Major-General Sherman, stating that General Hascall is across Utoy Creek and General Baird is passing; to watch well the effect on the extreme left, and at whatever point signal officers can see in Atlanta. 3.30 p. m., received telegram from General Thomas directing General Stanley to strengthen our skirmish line and make a bold dash against the enemy, and to capture his picket-line at any rate.

58 R R-VOL XXXVIII, PT I