crossing and seize a prominent hill opposite, which was held by the enemy with rifle-pits. Peach Tree Creek at this point was about twenty feet wide, and deep, with marshy banks and muddy bottom. The hills on both sides were steep, irregular, and heavily timbered, while along both banks was a narrow strip of cleared land, widening beyond my right and extending out into an open country to my left, in front of the right of the Fourth Corps. No bridges or roads crossed the stream in my front. Under personal supervision of Major-General Hooker, and also of myself, both batteries of the division were quickly posted on prominent points in the woods opposite the hill mentioned above, which projected nearer the creek than any other of those held by the enemy. Small epaulements of logs were constructed for the protection of the gunners, while the pioneer corps prepared stringers, logs, and rails for bridge construction. At 3 p.m. my twelve pieces of artillery opened on the hills opposite, and my skirmishers, which had been re-enforced to a very heavy line, poured in a furious musketry fire. Under cover of this a foot bridge was constructed by the pioneer corps, and Ireland's brigade filed across on the double-quick, formed on the other side into line, and charged and carried the hill. All was done very quickly. The enemy, completely surprised, fled, leaving 23 prisoners and their intrenching tools in our hands. My other two brigades followed immediately, formed on Ireland's right, and erected strong breast-works as a tete-de-pont for our place of crossing. My skirmish lines were advanced in the dusk until they encountered the newly established picket-line of the enemy, about a quarter of a mile in my front. During the night two other bridges were thrown across the creek in my rear, and roads to them were cut for artillery and wagons. The enemy during the afternoon opened a battery about three-quarters of a mile obliquely in front of my left flank, and fired a number of shots at the troops crossing the bridge, but without effect. July 20, early in the morning Williams' division crossed and formed on the hills to my right. About the same time Ward's crossed and formed line in the valley to my left. At 10 a.m., in compliance with orders, my skirmishers moved forward, supported by Candy's brigade, Jones' brigade following Candy's. Crossing two timbered ridges in front of my breast-works, the enemy's skirmishers were driven, after a sharp engagement, from the third ridge in the woods and from a corn-field on the right of it. This position gained was a most important one, and was immediately, at 12 m., occupied by Candy's brigade in line. A few rails were piled up by the troops as a protection along their front. While Candy's brigade took position on the ridge a closely contested skirmish was going on between the enemy, and the skirmishers of Ward's division, the latter attempting to gain possession of a large cleared hill directly to my left. A section of Bundy's battery was brought up, went into position on my left in the edge of the woods, and opened an enfilading fire upon the enemy opposed to Ward. Ward's skirmishers advancing at the same time, the enemy fled. I now placed Jones' brigade in two lines in support of Candy's, brought up all my artillery and posted it on Candy's line, and had Ireland's brigade massed on the ridge behind Jones. Major-General Hooker informed me that General Williams had been directed to advance on my right and connect. The left of General Williams was then about 500 yards directly in rear of my right, which was much exposed, inclining (necessarily from the shape of the ridge) slightly toward the front. The position here, to be understood with refer-