it, with Osterhaus on his left. Harrow's division, at first in the reserve, was afterward deployed farther to the left to fill up a gap caused by the withdrawal of troops of the Twentieth Corps. Here, during the rest of the day, Colonel Reuben Williams' brigade, of Harrow's division, was engaged constantly, with heavy and continuous skirmishing, with considerable loss. Captain Griffiths, First Iowa Battery, and chief of artillery Fourth Division, placed his guns in position in an open field, directly exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery and engaged them during the afternoon, with damaging effect, entirely disabling two of the enemy's guns, which were left on the field when he evacuated. The line rested at night in the position described, the skirmishers advanced well forward, generally holding the line of Camp Creek. Slight rifle-pits were thrown up by the troops for their protection, and works built for the batteries by the pioneers, a strong show of artillery having been developed in the heavy forts of the enemy. The position of my command at Resaca is shown in the accompanying plan, Numbers 1.* On the morning of the 14th sharp skirmishing and heavy artillery exchanges were renewed. During the morning the several brigades of Harrow's division were removed from their positions on the left and stationed in rear of M. L. Smith's and Osterhaus' divisions as reserves. Appearances indicating that a severe battle was in progress upon the extreme left of our army, I caused a feint attack to be made, and continued for some time lively demonstrations to deter the enemy from sending re-enforcements from our front. General Osterhaus took advantage of the feint to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily wooded valley near the road. This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp Creek was carried, and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown froward into the woods previously occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living tete-de-pont, which in the ensuing movement proved of great value. Directly in front of M. L. Smith's division, and at a distance varying from one-half to three-quarters of a mile from it, a series of low, irregular hills extended from he Oostenaula due north as far as the Resaca road. They were occupied by the enemy in force, and were partially fortified. This position, if in our possession, would bring us within three-eights of a mile of the enemy's nearest fort, and within half a mile of the railroad bridge, thus practically cutting the railroad. To gain this position had been the work intended for the next day, and a number of bridges were to have been thrown over Camp Creek on the night of the 14th instant to facilitate the passage of troops, but the continuous artillery and musketry fire on the left, and the necessity for us to make a further diversion, precipitated the movement, and at 5.30 p. m. of the 14th the assaulting column crossed Camp Creek as best they could, some over the bridge, others on logs, and others wading,with their arms and equipments held over their heads. The assaulting force consisted of Brigadier General Charles R. Woods' brigade, of the First Division; the Third Missouri Infantry, of the Third Brigade, being substituted for the Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, which, being engaged as skirmishers, was unavailable, on the left, and Brigadier General Giles A. Smith's brigade, of the Second Division, on the right. Both brigades were formed in double lines, and in front and on the left of Woods' brigade the Twelfth Missouri Infantry, disposed as skirmishers, accompanied

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*To appear in the Atlas.

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