among the rebels that night that the men who double-quicked across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay. Skirmishers were thrown well out, and the men intrenched during the night.

The loss in command, to include this date, was 102 killed, 512 wounded, and 14 missing; aggregate, 628. We captured 92 prisoners. The loss of the enemy in my front in killed and wounded is estimated at 1,500.

During the entire day of the 15th skirmishing and artillery firing was kept up, with more or less vigor. I caused artillery to be placed in the most advantageous situations in the position captured the previous day, and the railroad bridge and the town were thus held entirely at our mercy. During the night of the 15th and 16th the enemy evacuated hi entire line, and retreated southward, his extreme left at Resaca being of necessity held to the last. Although the sound of the heavy firing on the extreme left of our line, continuing late into the night, did not make it appear as if an immediate evacuation were probable, the skirmish lines in front of my command were strengthened, and were directed to press the enemy constantly at all points during the night. At about daylight in the Resaca, driving the enemy's rear guard across the Oostenaula, and preventing them from destroying the common road bridge. the railroad bridge, however, could not be saved, and was completely burned up.

Anticipating orders to follow in pursuit on the main south road, I at once commenced moving my command across the river, several of my advance regiments having crossed the bridge, when, in compliance with directions from Major-General McPherson, I halted the command until further orders. Special Field Orders, Numbers 11, Department and Army of the Tennessee, arriving soon after, in compliance therewith, I moved my command on the Rome road, crossing the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, from which point I followed General Dodge's command. Learning that he was attacked by the enemy about three miles from the ferry, at his request for assistance, I double-quicked Osterhaus' division to his support, and deployed it on the crest of the hills, on the south side of the road, in the most favorable position to resist an attack, and held the other two divisions in reserve. It soon became certain that no serious attack need be anticipated, and every evidence going to show that the enemy had retired, the command was moved forward in the direction of McGuire's, about a mile east of which I went into camp. On the morning of the 18th my command was placed in the advance, and was continued in that position until our arrival at Dallas. A small force of the enemy's cavalry, with a battery of artillery, harassed our front, but without materially impeding us. At Adairsville I moved in a southwesterly direction, by a by-road to Woodland, on the Kingston and Rome road, campaign in line of battle, with Smith's division in reserve. On the morning of the 19th heavy cannonading being heard in the direction of Kingston, it was deemed proper to park the train at Woodland, leaving a regiment to guard it. I then moved cautiously on the Kingston road, with Osterhaus' division in advance, followed by Smith's and Harrow's divisions. We reached Kingston, however, without opposition that afternoon, and camped on the Etowah River.