as the few who attempted to lay hands on them were shot down. The fighting at this point was close and deadly. As line upon line of the enemy debouched upon the open plateau, within eighty yards of our works, they were met by a front and flank fire from brave men, who stood unflinchingly to their guns, under the orders of their efficient officers. Colonel Walcutt, commanding the brigade engaged, stood on the parapet, amid the storm of bullets, ruling the fight. Line after line was sent back broken to their works, and in half an hour the assault was over, their dead and wounded only occupying the ground on which they advanced. The assault on Smith's division commenced a few minutes after that on Harrow, and that on Osterhaus a short time later still. The nature of the ground on these fronts being less favorable for the enemy than that on Harrow's front, they were repulsed very handsomely, and with great loss, though they held on for some time tenaciously, but uselessly. Their dead and severely wounded were mostly left on the field. The engagement, from first to last, lasted about one hour, our troops in may places following the enemy, in their retreat, to their works.

My losses were as follows: Killed, 30; wounded, 295; missing, 54; aggregate, 379. We captured 97 prisoners. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 2,000. We buried of the enemy's dead in my front over 300 bodies.

In compliance with Special Field Orders, Numbers 23, Department and Army of the Tennessee, on the evening of May 29 I commenced withdrawn the right of my command from the works, the intention of the movement being to change the position of the Army of the Tennessee and of General Garrard's command to the left, to connect with the Army of the Cumberland, from which we had been separated by a gap of several miles. Part of the troops on my extreme right had been withdrawn, when the enemy demonstrated heavily along the entire front, making it necessary to return all the troops to the trenches again. During the whole night these demonstrations were continued at intervals. At several points, especially on the left of Osterhaus, there was evidence that their feints were intended to be turned into real attacks upon the discovery of any evidence of weakness in our lines. From 11 p. m. until about 3 a. m. the musketry fire on both sides was more or less vigorously sustained, and our intended movement was not accomplished. No further change was attempted until the 1st of June, when at daylight I again commenced withdrawing, beginning with the right of my line (previously a retired line had been constructed by the pioneers of the corps), crossing the road near the eastern edge of Dallas. In this line I placed the troops and batteries until the skirmishers were withdrawn, and everything was in readiness for the complete withdrawal. It was afterwards discovered that this maneuver completely deceived the enemy for the time as to our intentions. this temporary line of works crossed the Villa Rica road perpendicularly about half a mile from Dallas, and commanded the large, open field in which the villa Rica and Marietta roads intersected. the withdrawal was effected speedily and without loss, the column passing through the defensive works above mentioned, followed closely by the enemy's skirmishers, who, seeing the works and hearing from them, were deceived into the belief, as it was afterward learned, that the new line was to be permanently held. As soon as it was evident that the enemy was not prepared to follow and attack