battery, which for a few moments caused some confusion in rear of my line. The Second Iowa Infantry, of Colonel Rice's brigade, was immediately ordered to cross the creek and charge the battery. It moved promptly forward for that purpose, and received a heavy fire, but found the creek impassable. The enemy, however, discovering the moment, withdrew. A new line was immediately formed in an extension of the First Brigade, Second Division, on the line of hills before alluded to; the Fourth Division forming on the right of Colonel Rice, the Second and Third Brigades, Second Division, were drawn back and formed as a rear line and reserve. Major-General McPherson arrived on the ground just before the attack of the enemy and after their defeat ordered the troops to bivouac in the new position. Skirmishers were pushed forward and crossed the ground fought over. At dark the Fifteenth Army Corps arrived and formed on my right. During the night my transportation crossed the river and came up. My loss during the day was about 70 killed and wounded; that of the enemy unknown. From prisoners captured I ascertained that three divisions of Hardee's corps were intrenched at the cross-roads, covering Calhoun and the railroad. I cannot speak in terms too highly of the conduct of Colonel M. M. Bane. He found the enemy in his front in force largely superior to his own, and forming and handling his brigade with consummate skill fought it successfully. Nor can I speak too highly of the conduct of the gallant and limited Colonel P. E. Burke, commanding Second Brigade, who fell at the head of his brigade while engaged in checking the enemy's charge, and front his wounds there received died a few days after at Resaca. His loss fell heavily upon the command. An officer of acknowledge ability, he had already won the esteem and secured the confidence of all in his superior judgment on the march and in battle. In this engagement his prompt action and quick and skillful management of his three regiments, with their steady unflinching fire, converted a promised serious disaster to the command into one to the enemy.

At 7 p. m. of May 17 the command moved out toward Kingston, via McGuire's and Adairsville and Woodland roads, and after two nights and one day and a half's march reached Kingston, where transportation was reduced and twenty day's short rations for men and animals collected. May 22, the Third Brigade of the Second Division, Colonel M. M. Bane, commanding, was detached from the command and sent to Rome, Ga., to garrison that place, and did not take any further part in the campaign. On May 23 the command moved out on the Van Wert road, with orders to concentrate at Pumpkin Vine Post-Office, some ten miles south of Dallas. After three days and two nights' tedious march, as reach guard to the army, the command reached Little Pumpkin Vine Creek, ten miles southeast of Dallas, and one mile and a half south of Moody's Mills, on the direct road to Pumpkin Vine Post-Office, late in the night of the 25th. At 12 o'clock that night I received orders to move north, camp on the Van Wert and Dallas road, and be prepared at daylight to advance with the rest of the army on Dallas. The troops had hardly bivouacked, when, daylight having arrived, the advance was moved out on a cross-road, striking the main Dallas road at Pumpkin Vine Creek. A crossing was effected, the command formed in line, advanced upon, and after slight skirmishing, entered Dallas, General Jeff. C. Davis' division, of the Fourteenth Army Corps, entering at the same time from the north.