most due west. The swing to the right directed would, when completed, change the facing to the north. Soon after the movement began I observed Brown's command (Bate's division) on the right of the front line to be swinging to the right, while Cleburne's division, on the left, under Brigadier-General Lowrey, continued to advance directly forward. The result of this was soon to create a gap in the line between the two divisions. Almost at the instant our forward movement commenced, the enemy opened an active shelling from several batteries, and shortly afterward engagement with small-arms commenced on the right of Brown's line, which was nearest the enemy, and seemed extending rapidly along toward the left. Lowrey still continuing to advance directly forward without swinging, it was evident the gap in the line already created must be increased, and, besides, in conforming to his movement and under the order to touch to the left, my own line was being carried in that direction and away from what appeared the main action. To avoid this and at same time prevent the exposure which would ensue to both divisions in front, respectively, on their left and right flanks, I directed my two right brigades (Porter's and Gordon's) to rapidly take position on the left and in prolongation of Brown's line, and thus fill the gap in the front line. At same time staff officers were dispatched to superintend and secure the swinging of my two left brigades to the right, that my whole command, if necessity arose, might be directed in concert. While awaiting for a short time the return of one of my messengers to the left, I was joined on the field by General Cleburne, to whom I stated the dispositions just ordered, and, with his approval, proceeded to taken personal supervision of the two brigades directed to the front line. On my way with this purpose, and a very few moments after parting with General Cleburne, I was ordered, through a staff officer from him, "to swing my whole division to the right and attack the enemy in flank or rear." Staff officers were instantly sent to press forward my two left brigades to junction with the two right ones. For execution of this order and with the object of getting what information could be had as to the ground to be passed and strength and position of the enemy, I moved directly to my right, which had already been considerably advanced in the new direction to be taken. Portions of Brown's command were soon met passing back, who stated they had just been repulsed by the enemy, whom they found in heavy force and behind strong intrenchments. Upon this information I hastened forward and soon joined the right of Porter's brigade with Gordon's, being in prolongation to the left of Brown's line, a large portion of which, after its repulse, had reformed under cover of woods on my right, and was holding position some 350 yards from enemy's works. The contest before the enemy's works was a short one, and, in point of fact, these two brigades had not been able to reach the front line before its repulse was completed, and their instructions having been to take position on the left of Brown's line to fill the gap in the front line caused by the diverging courses, as has been indicated, of the two division composing it, their commanders felt it their duty to conform to the movement of that line, and not, under the circumstances, to press assault upon the enemy's works unless in concert with the front line or other troops, or by reason of additional orders, and had sent an officer (Captain Locke) to advise me of this, and also as to the force, position, and intrenchments of the enemy. Captain Locke missed seeing me, but, as I have since