executed to the best advantage and without delay beyond the arrival of McCulloch's command while awaiting this, brigade commanders present were assembled that I might learn of them which, if any, particular part of enemy's position in their front was most favorable for assault. My impression, however, as already formed, was unchanged by this. Each thought the position without material difference in the strength of its parts, enemy's works being about same distance from our line at all points, and the ground in front of all alike, an open field, affording no cover for approach, and commanded about equally in all parts by the batteries developed. Such being the condition, and the ground immediately to my right - the same from which the left of Brown's command in single line had been repulsed - being well covered with timber, extending, apparently, fully up to the enemy's position, I concluded it best to change my formation from single to double lines and make attack over this, instead of attempting it across the open ground in my front. McCullough's command, which had just come up, was moved by the right flank to the rear of my right brigade, the purpose being, when this was in position, to pass the whole division by same movement under cover of the woods on my right, and then, joining Carter's brigade to McCullogh's for a second line, attack the enemy's works in this formation; but before McCullough was in position, and, I think, before my messenger, Captain Porter, even had time to reach General Gleburne with communication as to affairs, I received an order from General Cleburne not to assault the enemy in his works, and to hold my division intact.

I have stated at the time my two first brigades arrived from the reserve upon the front line the repulse of the front line had taken place, and have also mentioned the circumstances under which Captain Locke, as a messenger from the commanders of these, reported to General Cleburne. I cannot say if the order not to attack the enemy in his works was made on account of this report, or because it was at the time deemed necessary to hold all troops, which had not been broken, ready to prevent the repulse we had sustained being pressed by the enemy to more serious disaster. Shortly after receiving the order not to attack the works, I was advised by General Cleburne, through one of his staff, that he was then withdrawing his own division, under General Lowrey, from my left, and that I must make my dispositions accordingly. On this instruction one regiment of McCullough's command was directed to be deployed, extending toward the swamp on my left, and with this established for observation to advise of and protect against any movement of enemy upon or around my left flank, my command kept position until I was directed by General Cleburne to withdraw to the position near Jonesborough, from which I had advanced. This movement was completed about 10 o'clock at night, and under instructions the command was supplied with its implements for intrenching.

Brigade commanders have my thanks and commendation for courage, zeal, and efficiency. The staff with me on the field were: Major Ingram, assistant adjutant-general; Major Vaulx, assistant inspector-general; Captain M. B. Pilcher, assistant quartermaster; Mr. Abbot Robertson, and Frank Porterfield, volunteers from Major-General Cheatham's personal staff. The large experience of some and high gallantry and promptness of all these were of great aid to me in the movements and management of the command.