and the bushes thinned out in their front, forming an inferior abatis. I in person superintended the deployment of a line of skirmishers in front of Gist's brigade, and the pioneers of Cleburne's division soon cut down bushes in their front, forming a good abatis. I also ordered that the skirmishers should be extended 200 or 300 yards to the right of the brigade, and that one man of every four should be advanced 400 or 500 yards, to deceive the enemy and check his advance. This done, I was informed by Lieutenant-General Hardee that another brigade had been ordered to report to me, to continue the extension of the line to the right; but by my request he sent an engineer to select the line, and placed Brigadier-General Lewis in command of his own brigade, Gist's, and the one en route for the right of the line. Before I had time to give my further attention to the point where the works were to be changed on Govan's line, the enemy was advancing on my whole front. He made a vigorous assault on Govan's line at the angle formed by the change above alluded to, but the assault was repulsed. He then advanced in three separate columns, all converging upon this point, and in the second assault he carried that part of the work. This necessitated the giving up of the whole of the ground occupied by Govan's and Lewis' brigades. Brigadier-General Govan, about 600 of his officers and men, and 8 pieces of artillery here fell into the enemy's hands. Brigadier-General Granbury then threw his line back and began to form a line perpendicular to his original one, but, by my order, he immediately reoccupied his works and held them until after the close of the engagement. Colonel P. V. Green reformed a portion of Govan's brigade, charged, and retook a portion of the works, but could not hold them. Major-General Cleburne threw Vaughan's brigade into the lurch, which, with the assistance of the remaining portions of Govan's and Lewis' brigades, completely checked the advance of the enemy. Heavy demonstrations were made upon my whole front, but no determined assault, except upon Govan's brigade.

By personal observation since the battle I find that the new work ordered for the right regiment of Govan's brigade was in a very imperfect state, and that the old work in front had not been destroyed as I had ordered. Colonel Green, now commanding Govan's brigade, is of the opinion that the heavy shelling of the enemy prevented the execution of the order above mentioned. The old work furnished cover to the enemy and gave them great advantage over the men in the incomplete new work. Our whole force being in one rank, and the enemy having this advantage, to hold the work was impossible.

The men acted most gallantly, pouring a heavy fire into the massed columns of the enemy and inflicting heavy loss, as the extensive grave-yards of the enemy now show. He could not advance over the temporary works which he had taken, and in his heavy and confused masses could not seriously injure us.

Night came and closed the contest, and at 11 p. m. we quietly withdrew.

Each brigade sustained some loss during the day, but the principal loss was in Govan's brigade. (For particulars in regard to loss please see reports of brigade commanders.)

The loss of the division on that day, as taken from the reports of brigade commanders, was 55 killed, 197 wounded, and 659 missing. The whole loss of the division in the two days in killed, wounded, and missing was 1,086.