that the enemy had gained the road, and was gradually driving back our cavalry. Brown's division was at once formed on the left of and obliquely to the road, and Clayton's division on the right, connecting by a line of skirmishers with the main works around the city. As soon as Brown was formed he moved forward, handsomely driving the enemy across the road and to a distance half a mile beyond, where he encountered temporary breast-works, from which he was driven back with considerable loss. Clayton's division moved forward as soon as formed, and about ten minutes after Brown's advance, and met with similar results. I found it difficult to rally Brown's division and move it against the enemy a second time. The consequence was that one or two brigades of this division, as also of Clayton's division, sustained heavy losses because of the failure in the attack of portions of their lines. Walthall's division, of Stewart's corps, had moved out on the Lick Skilled road, while Brown's and Clayton's divisions were engaging the enemy. At my suggestion this division was thrown against the enemy where Brown had attacked. The enemy was still within easy range of the Lick Skilled road, and I believed that he would yield before a vigorous attack. The effort, however, was a failure, and the troops were formed on the road, and during the night were withdrawn, by order of the commanding general, to a more suitable position, connecting with the works immediately around Atlanta. The enemy had two corps engaged in this affair; still I am convinced that if all the troops had displayed equal spirit we would have been successful, as the enemy's works were slight, and besides they had scarcely gotten into position when we made the attack.

From the 28th of July to the 5th of August the enemy cautiously pushed forward his lines toward ours, erecting new lines of works as he advanced. Several severe attacks were made upon the works of my skirmish line, but no assault was made upon the main intrenched line. The enemy in almost every instance was severely repulsed. On the 6th Major-General Bate's division, of Hardee's corps (which had reported to me temporarily in place of Stevenson's division, which had been detached from my corps and put in position immediately in front of Atlanta), took position on my left almost perpendicularly to our main line and along the Sandtown road. This division in one night constructed a very strong skirmish line, and with such little display that the enemy on the 6th, findings as he supposed only a slight impediment to the extension of his lines, at once moved a corps to attack, which was signally and handsomely repulsed. Much credit is due General Bate and his division for their conduct. The enemy was exceedingly cautious in his movements after this affair. His extension to our left was gradual, and he seemed determined to push his lines more closely to our in my front, with the view of making an assault. The skirmishing along Patton Anderson's (formerly Hindman's) and Clayton's divisions amounted to almost an engagement for a week. Hardee's corps had been placed on my left to check the enemy, who continued extending to the left. About the 2nd the enemy retired from his position in front of Atlanta, making quite a detour to the left of my corps, which extended to the West Point and Atlanta Railroad, three-quarters of a mile beyond East Point. Stevenson's division reported to me by 11 a. m. on the 30th of August. Hardee's corps was on my left, and was gradually relieved by my corps in order it might extend farther to the left.