quarters to hold the division in readiness to move to the left at 4 o'clock the following morning. At the appointed hour the command was withdrawn from the trenches, and, moving left in front, proceeded about two miles in the direction of East Point, when it was halted, by orders from corps headquarters, at the point where our line of march crossed the Campbellton road. We rested here till a bout 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when we were directed to proceed to East Point and relieve Cheatham's division, then in the trenches in front of that place, and on the left of the railroad running to West Point. The head of the column reached this position shortly before sundown and commenced relieving Cheatham's division as soon as the necessary information in regard to the lines, pickets, details, &c., could be obtained from Brigadier-General Maney, in command. About the time that the work of relieving General Manye's command had been completed, or nearly so (say at 9 p. m.), I received orders to withdraw the troops from the trenches and to follow Cheatham's division in the direction of Jonesborough. Repairing to General Maney's quarters to ascertain when he would be ready to move, I learned from him that he had received no orders to move to Jonesborough, but upon showing him mine he immediately made preparations to commence the movement. It was about 11 o'clock before his rear and the head of my column got in motion. Much delay was experienced because of the want of roads,and the absence of competent guides. The column was several times halted for an hour or more because the advance had taken the wrong road, or to remove some obstruction. Just before day on the morning of the 31st a halt occurred while I was about the center of my command, and riding forward to ascertain the cause, I met Brigadier-General Carter, now commanding Cheatham's division, who informed me that Major-General Cleburen, of Hardee's corps, who was in advance, had sent back to in form him that the enemy had taken possession of a bridge in his (Cleburne's) front, and that the troops must be halted until he (Cleburne) could reconnoiter the position and ascertain whether or not a passage of the stream could be effected. In the mean time, the better to be prepared against an attack, should the enemy feel disposed to make it, I ordered a strong line of skirmishers to be thrown out in our front, and a couple of batteries of artillery to be put in eligible positions for defense. Before these dispositions, however, could be completed, the lieutenant-general commanding the corps overtook me, and, approving my action, directed me to remain in my then position until he had ridden forward and obtained further information in regard to the exact situation. I had not remained long where he left me until a staff officer returned with orders for me to follow with the whole division. Very soon Cheatham's division began to move forward, and I followed with the commands well closed up. Before the column was all in motion, however, the sun had risen, and a clear, cloudless sky betokened fair weather-at least for the day's operations. The march during the night had been toilsome in the extreme to troops who had not been out of the trenches for thirty days, and daylight revealed a wearied and jaded column, with ranks considerably diminished by straggling during the night. Although the most diligent exertions were made by the officers of all grades to prevent this evil, their efforts were but partially successful. The darkness of night, the dense woods through which was frequently marched without roads, the want of shoes by many, and the lack of recent exercise