and either or both very sudden; take up my whole army and move to Resaca, or leave you here with Stoneman's cavalry at the point now occupied by you to cover this narrow outlet, and with Thomas to issue on the east of Rocky Face at Sugar Valley and interpose between Johnston and his base. The latter I prefer. If possible, hurry Stoneman, and write me your opinion.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General.

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.

General SCHOFIELD:

DEAR GENERAL: I have just sent Major McCoy to see you about a movement through Snake Creek Gap, on Resaca, thus opening Dalton. We hold Snake Creek to its debouch into Sugar Valley, and to force a passage by the north would separate our forces too much and push Johnston more compact; and to pass Buzzard Roost would be to enter the very trap prepared for us. Your report of withdrawal is perfectly satisfactory, and was described to me by Captain Pe, as seen from the mountain, as very handsome. Let me hear from you on the subject of my first note, and state specifically the position of all your troops at 12 m. to-day, as you understood them, Stoneman included.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
May 10, 1864.

[General SHERMAN:]

GENERAL: My opinion is in favor of the first of the plans you propose, ie., to take your whole army to Resaca. To leave my small command here (at Tunnel Hill and this place) would simply result in my being idle or being whipped. The moment Johnston discovered the move he would turn upon me, drive me back, and capture your supplies at Tunnel Hill, then turn upon you. If you can carry with you large supplies to Resaca than Johnston has north of that point, I believe your success would not be doubtful, even if Dalton were fortified toward the south, which I understand it is not. Dalton being not fortified toward the south, if you can carry supplies enough to last while you defeat Johnston in open field, and then reopen your communication with Chattanooga, your success seems more than probable. Would not 12,000 men be more certain to aid you by being with you in Johnston's rear, than by trying to hold Tunnel Hill with Johnston between it and the main army? If there was any certainty of my force being able to do what is desired in your second plan, I would regard the latter as less objectionable, for I understand that Thomas and McPherson are stronger than Johnston. With my present impression, I think it would be little more than throwing away my command, at least so far as the present operations are concerned, to leave it here.

I have perhaps expressed my opinion more decidedly than is justified by the short time I have had to consider the question, and my limited knowledge of some of the less important date upon which such as