back with my small train a considerable portion of force that I expected to carry with me. I shall have to reduce my force to about 1,000 men in order to go on. I shall sift the command and retain only the best mounted and most effective. I fear I shall be detained here until to-morrow in order to get my train across and up to this place. Armistead is across, Neely crosses above, and my wagons below, but they not only have to ferry the river Coosa but smaller streams. I shall take no vehicles, except two ambulances, beyond Blue Pond.

Respectfully,

GID. J. PILLOW,

Brigadier-General, &c.

JUNE 21, 1864-8 a.m.

Major-General WHEELER:

GENERAL: I inclose a report* in relation to the enemy's left, in the hope that it offers such an opportunity as that which you used so well yesterday. Please examine. It has been necessary to remove General Hood's troops, so that I must depend on you to hold the right. General Hood's intrenchments are vacant. Would it be well to put one of your brigades into them now? If the cavalry mentioned in the report is exposed so that you can act against it, the occupation of the intrenchments might be postponed. I expected Humes to return to you yesterday, but General Jackson took him on a long expedition. I believe, however, that their main cavalry force is on Jackson's front. I want to put a reserve of a brigade during the day in rear of the gap in Kenesaw, and shall be obliged to draw on you for it.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

HEADQUARTERS,
In the Field, June 21, 1864.

Major SANDERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

MAJOR: Be so kind as to assure the major-general commanding that we are duly sensible of the weakness of our line, and in our anxiety have labored assiduously to impress upon my officers the necessity of vigilance and energy. Inspecting officers are not probably aware of, or disregard, the difficulties under which we labor. Our line was long, the men being deployed at wide intervals, in single rank, over an exceedingly difficult, precipitous, and rocky country. Our wagon of tools was ordered to division headquarters, and we were unfortunate in getting but a portion of them. We had no axes until late in the afternoon, and the men were not able to use them until late in the evening. Men cannot work upon the front crest or slope except at night. Officers and men are greatly fatigued, and in a great measure disabled through want of rest. Our skirmish line is very long and heavy, and its duties wearing upon the men. Our list of casualties indicates the danger of the position. I had three staff officers upon the line all day yesterday, and they assure me the men worked faithfully to the extent of the tools we had and when practicable positions could be found. Our line was too long for heavy work. We were taxed beyond our abilities. The movement to the left last night was effected by 2 o'clock this morning. But little work has been done upon the new positions, not enough to protect the

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*Not found.

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