with a cavalry expedition into Tennessee. I expressed the opinion then that it should not take place until the Tennessee River had fallen and such a juncture of affairs had occurred that it would be followed, not only by the direct results consequent from it, but by the relief of General Johnston's army. Should the movement now being made from Memphis prove to be a mere demonstration, it seems to me that the time has arrived for a movement across the river. It is now fordable. Sherman has left his rear exposed, with a very insufficient force of men, and they raw levies or negroes. At the crossing of the railroad over Elk River, for instance, from Athens to Columbia, there are only fifty negroes and four white officers; they rely on a stockade of square logs on each bank. The bridge is dry pine. At Columbia the railroad bridge, with a full corps of builders, required forty-two days' work to complete it. Over Elk River, on the route from Stevenson to Nashville, is a bridge very lofty and difficult to build; the guard is frequently small. The destruction of these bridges would be of great importance, perhaps more than to seize Nashville, unless we had the means of holding it.

Sherman's army during the low stage of the Cumberland River is no longer solely dependent on the Nashville and Louisville Railroad for above Fort Henry, has been completed. In case we could destroy the depot supplies at Nashville, the spoiling of this road and the destruction of the bridge over the Harpeth afterward would not only greatly delay the renewal of the supply, but furnish a good route of retreat for a cavalry force, after the hornets' nest had been completely aroused, which could either cross the Tennessee below the mouth of Duck River, or cross Duck River at some ford about Centreville, and, coming via Waynesborough, ford the Tennessee River into Seven-Mile Island, or at Old Georgetown, six miles above the mouth of Bear Creek. There are several places on the Tennessee River where a force hotly pursued by Yankees could throw themselves, by fording, onto an island, where the flanks couldn't be turned, and the crossing could be made at leisure.

In contemplating a movement into Tennessee with a mounted force, the mind is confused by the multiplicity of objects which might be accomplished, but a selection of these, with sagacious arrangements for their execution, would be indispensable. A controlling idea should be to cross the river at some point near the enemy-say mouth of Elk River-from which you could suddenly burst upon them, leaving the most westwardly ford for the retreat. Entering, too, at this point, Decatur would fall into your hands without a direct attack. Huntsville might be threatened-but by no means attacked-long enough to cause a concentration of troops for its defense and to allow a detachment to destroy the bridges over Elk River and Richland Creek, and the main force could march on Winchester, destroy the bridge over Elk River on the other route, and then, having provided against the transportation of infantry from Sherman's army, they would have things their own way, provided our cavalry was stronger than the enemy's-which I presume would be the case-destroy the bridge at Columbia, and, marching toward Nashville, could take all points except that. If Nashville were made the first point of attack, even that place might be taken.

On reviewing my letter I feel that I owe you an apology for its crude views. I think, however, that you will perceive from the facts stated the indispensable necessity of holding the country from Decatur to Bear Creek, if an expedition into Tennessee is meditated.

I remain, with great regard, your friend and servant,

JAMES E. SAUNDERS.