days. If the enemy detach force enough to capture Marietta we cannot fail to turn his flank and destroy his army and still have on hand ten days' supplies. The crossing at Sandtown can be controlled with the left of the army resting on lower Utoy (our present right), and I think the plan cannot require any farther movement to the right. The enemy will hardly venture to send infantry across the Chattahoochee while we have possession of Sandtown. Our trains between Utoy and Camp Creek will be quite secure, and need be no incumbrance in this movement. In a rapid prolongation of our lines we have great advantage over the enemy in this: All our troops are veterans, while, probably, more than half of his are militia. He must concentrate his veterans to meet each movement, and then after he has intrenched his extended line his veterans must be relieved by militia and prepared to meet the next movement. On this account it would probably be best to move two corps at a time, as it would require all of the enemy's available veterans to meet this force. It is hardly possible that the enemy can endure three such battles, as he can thus be compelled to fight in as many consecutive days.

In case this plan should be adopted, even in its main features, I would suggest that in the first movement General Thomas put his two corps in on the right of the Fourteenth, leaving mine in reserve, as it virtually is now and let me make the next move on his right, or even on the right of General Howard, if that be preferred. This will bring General Thomas' three corps together and allow mine to take a more hazardous part (if not more important one) in a movement which I recommend.

I would also suggest as a matter of detail what I consider an improvement upon the prevalent mode of making such movement such movements, viz, that instead of gradually unfolding from the flank of the corps already in position, the corps moving in detach itself a mile or so from the flank and march in strong order of battle directly upon the point to be gained. In the comparatively open country to our present right this method will be entirely practicable and much more rapid and decisive than the prevalent method. I feel confident that this plan ought to succeed, and its hazards appear less to me than any other that promises success. Yet I suggest it with diffidence, and do not feel at all sure that it is as good a plan as that suggested by you yesterday, though the latter seems very difficult of execution. I am carefully considering the details of movement involved in your plan, and will give you my views as soon as possible. Meanwhile I am preparing the position I now occupy as a pivot on which the first portion of that movement can be made.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Near Atlanta, Ga., August 14, 1864.

Colonel ISRAEL GARRARD,

Commanding Cavalry Division, Army of the Ohio:

COLONEL: General Sherman is informed that a large body of the enemy's cavalry is now north of the Chattahoochee, making a raid upon our rear, and he desires to take advantage of their absence to operate on the enemy's flanks. General Kilpatrick's will cross the river at Sandtown to-morrow, and operate on the enemy's left, while Gen-