marauding band, it is a sad misfortune that re-enforcements did not arrive.

The Eight and Ninth Michigan Cavalry and the Eleventh Michigan Battery, under the command of Colonel James I. David, were ordered, at 6 p. m. on the 4th instant, by forced marches, to re-enforce the garrison. That command passed through Danville, 28 miles from Lebanon, before 11 at nigh, and went 7 miles farther on the Lebanon road, where it halted and remained until 7 o'clock next morning, when it resumed the march, and arrived at 3 p. m., showing this force was twenty-one hours in going from Hickman's Bridge and Stanford to Lebanon, neither place being over 42 miles distant; at least sixteen hours in going from Danville to Lebanon, and eight hours in making Lebanon from where they last halted, a distance of 21 miles, and that, after this, had rested six or seven hours. As the roads were good and the weather propitious, this force ought to have reached Lebanon by 5 o'clock on the morning of the 5th instant. But, allowing for accident, it should have arrived by 8 o'clock at farthest. Why this splendid body of soldiers, so well mounted and so much needed, did not arrive at Lebanon sooner I cannot tell. Lieutenant Bachus, of the Twentieth Kentucky, being unfit for active duty on account of wounds received at Shiloh, was sent out the night before to hurry forward the re-enforcements. He met Colonel David at 8 o'clock in the morning, 19 miles from Lebanon, delivered my message, and implored him to hurry on.

Lieutenant Lloyd, of the Twentieth Kentucky, in charge of a small scouting from town, between 10 and 11 o'clock, and urged him to go forward and relieve the garrison. Some of his own brave officers and men also entreated him to attack the enemy, yet, with all this pressing upon him, within the sound of the firing, and almost with view of the smoking ruins of the town, he refused to engage the enemy or to render me any assistance.

Had he arrived there at any time prior to 12 o'clock, everything would have been saved, and at any time prior to the surrender he could have saved my command. By his refusal to come up and co-operate with me, he allowed a brave little to be crushed by crushed by superior numbers, and denied his own gallant officers and men the privilege of engaging in a conflict would have resulted in the brightest achievements of the war. Colonel David's command finally entered the town just as the enemy was leaving in great haste and confusion, and by a judicious pursuit, for which the roads and country were remarkably favorable, many of Morgan's command might been captured, his forces cut to pieces, and the prisoners he had taken at Lebanon been recaptured. Instead of that he was permitted to retire unmolested except by a few shells which were thrown at his rear guard. I have labored in vain to find a reason or even an apology for this strange conduct on the part of Colonel David, and after thoroughly examining all the facts in the premises, I am forces to the conclusion that he was actuated by some unworthy motive, and that justice to myself and command, as well as to him and his command, demand an investigation of the causes which produced this disaster to our arms. At the same time on one would

be happier than myself to see Colonel David vindicated before the public, and the reproach to our arms wiped out.

Respectfully,

CHAS. S. HANSON,

Lieutenant-Colonel Twentieth Kentucky Infantry, Commanding.

Captain A. C. SEMPLE, Asst. Adjt. General, Louisville, Ky.