and is sure of beating us, it is no use to drive him across Duck River, unless we have sufficient force on this flank to keep him there; otherwise he will return to near our front, wherever that may be. This point is quite as far from our base as it is safe to push troops, considering our communication with the base and center. You do not seem to understand why it is so difficult to surprise and crush Van Dorn. In the first place, he keeps every road and lane and hill-top for miles picketed; the country people are his friends and are always ready to give information. His policy is to fight when he is sure to win, and always run when his success is doubtful. The nature of his troops, being mounted, without baggage or transportation, enables him to do this with great facility; besides, a portion of his troops were [raised] here, and know every road and by path. If my force here had always been sufficiently large to cope with and beat Van Dorn, he never could have gained any advantage over us; but the truth is, I have been kept here with a force about one-half as large as his, of new and inferior troops, working night and day on fortifications and doing arduous guard duty. When it becomes necessary to punish or move against Van Dorn we are compelled to bring troops from distant points, which, of course, becomes at once known to him. He holds himself in readiness to run, and the golden opportunity is lost before they arrive. In case we move against Van Dorn, and he gives us battle, I can defeat him. I think it will amply pay for the needful movements and risk. I am extremely anxious to whip Van Dorn, and settle up accounts with him contracted at Thompson's Station and Brentwood.

G. GRANGER,

Major-General.

GALLATIN, April 12, 1863-11.50 a.m.

General GARFIELD,

Chief of Staff:

I am confident that there is, at least probably, 15,000 men in Lebanon and roads toward Baird's Mills and Liberty. They told a rebel, who told my detective, that word was given out yesterday morning and Friday that, by God, they would hold Lebanon, if it took all of their army. I shall draw out my ferry-boats, and, if driven to it, destroy them. The rebels must hold Lebanon or fail in supplies.

E. A. PAINE,

Brigadier-General.

GALLATIN, April 12, 1863-2.10 p.m.

General GARFIELD,

Chief of Staff:

Another scout has just come in who saw at least 1,000 men on the other side of the Cumberland, 16 miles from here, with some artillery. A rebel told him, supposing the scout to be a rebel, that they would hold Lebanon; that they intended to swim over enough to take the couriers coming from General Crook with the mail. I have no cavalry force to send, and it's too far for infantry and too late.

I am going to the river this evening to haul out my boats or destroy them.

E. A. PAINE,

Brigadier-General.