one heretofore attached to it; that a battery on outpost duty will be exclusively under the control of the brigadier-general to whose command it is attached, except that all returns will be made through the division chiefs of artillery to me, although the brigadier-general commanding may require such returns as he desires; that such battery will be supplied with rations and forage by the brigade commissary and quartermaster.

All artillery not on outpost duty is considered detached and in charge of the chiefs of artillery. On the field of battle the artillery will be placed in position by the chiefs of artillery, under the direction of the lieutenant-general commanding. If the emergency of the case requires it in your present condition, you will order any battery to move to any position you may desire, the captain commanding notifying the division chief of artillery of the change.

The artillery formerly associated with your division will continue to operate with it. The Washington Artillery and Cobb's battery being on outpost duty, are exclusively under the control of Brigadier-Generals Adams and Helm.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. HOXTON,

Major and Chief of Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF EAST TENNESSEE,
Knoxville, May 11, 1863.

General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON,

Commanding Department, &c.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 8th instant reached me yesterday evening. I had already received information from General Jones that his ability to re-enforce this command is small and doubtful, but that he will do so if he can.

I hope that, since the defeat of Hooker, re-enforcements will be sent here from the Virginia army, for unless the infantry force is largely increased, it will be difficult to defend East Tennessee against such a force as Burnside is reported to have.

The practicability of defending the passes in the Cumberland Mountains has been much considered by me, but there are many of them. They are very distant from here, and a force acting at one is cut off from the support and co-operation of those at the others. Therefore, it has seemed to me best, in the event of having to rely upon my present forces alone, to fortify Knoxville by erecting small redoubts on the eminences around it, so that a small garrison could hold it against cavalry or against on insurrectionary force, and then to march with the whole of the infantry and sufficient artillery to meet the enemy's main column so soon as its route should be certainly developed, upon Clinch River or the Copper Ridge, about 18 or 20 miles from the railroad. This would open the enemy's rear to our cavalry, and, in the event of his being checked, he would be in great danger of ruin, while we could, if necessary, retire upon Knoxville and hold it so long as our supplies would enable us. Meantime our cavalry outside could, if active, compel him to retire from the territory.

Burnside has so posted his troops that, while he may suddenly invade as, he appears to have great regard to the military occupancy of Kentucky, and that may be his sole object until Rosecrans moves or until harvest. If he enters East Tennessee before harvest, he must bring