The necessity of a measure of this kind was brought to the notice of the commission, and the propriety of urging it upon the Government seriously considered, nearly a year a year ago. Its purely sanitary necessity war then, however, deemed to be too remote to justify the proposed action. But, in the progress of events, there is no longer room for doubt that its advantages, in a sanitary point of view, would have been of the greatest value.

Similar advantages, we respectfully submit, would attend the same measure if taken at this time. From sanitary considerations alone, no regiment in the field should be allowed to remain seriously weakened in force for any considerable period. Holding full regiments in reserve, ready to be brought, as full regiments, into seriously weakened in force for any considerable period. Holding full regiments in reserve, ready to be brought, as full regiments, into active service, does not remedy the evil. Re-enforcements purely of raw recruits will not obviate it. But a million of trained militia, already withdrawn from ordinary occupations, and held in reserve far in the rear of active military life, would, in all probability, supply an adequate guard against it.

It is needless to point out the vast advantages under which men drawn from such reserves (whether as individual volunteers or drafted regiments) would take the field. They would have acquired not merely military training, but ability to take care of themselves in camp, and experience in cooking, in camp police, in personal cleanliness, and in everything that affects their sanitary condition. Above all, they would have passed through what may be called the acclimating period of military life, during which the available strength of many of our newly raised regiments has been reduced more than one-half by measles and other like diseases.

The number we have named as proper to be kept in reserve will not be thought excessive when it is considered that, according to experience thus far in the ar, 123,000 men must be annually recruited to maintain a force of 500,000 in the field in full strength.

The total number of men who are to fall sick and die or be disabled by sickness in the Army will necessarily be proportional to the time which is required for the suppression of the rebellion. A sustained force sufficiently large to crush all opposition before it is therefore considerations clearly apply, and with even greater force, to losses in actual conflict, which are within the certain limits inversely as the strength of the attacking party. We may also remember that the actual expenditures of a war are also always in proportion to strength, and that an overwhelming force, sustained to the end, is therefore necessarily the cheapest.

We finally beg to observe that the effective military force which a nation is able to sustain in the field, not that which it can raise under the spasmodic excitement of emergencies, is the measure of the respect and consideration it is likely to receive abroad as well as at home. We have the honor to be, Mr. President, with great respect, your obedient servants,

HENRY W. BELLOWS,

W. H. VAN BUREN, M. D.,

C. R. ANNEW, M. D.,

WOLCOTT GIBBS, M. D.,

GEO. T. STRONG,

FRED. LAW OLMSTEAD,

Executive Committee Sanitary Commission.