WASHINGTON, September 27, 1862.

His Excellency Governor GAMBLE,

Saint Louis:

GOVERNOR: Yours of the 22nd in relation to command of volunteers and militia officers is received.

I am informed that the General Government has uniformly acted on the ground that the clause of the Constitution (art. 1, sec. 8, p. 15) respecting the "appointment of officers and the authority of training the militia" refers only to the officers of the organization under which they are broughte of the United States, and that the commanding or "governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States" belongs to the Federal Government, or, in the other words, may be "prescribed by Congress." For example, when the militia of a state is called into the service of the United States by regiments, the regimental officers must be appointed by the State; so when called in by brigades, the brigade officers must also be so appointed. But it by no means follows that these regiments or brigades when once in the service are to be commanded always and only by officers so appointed. On the contrary, such organizations are to be "governed" or commanded as may be prescribed by Congress, or, in the absence of any law on that subject, as may be directed by the President as Commander-in- Chief, always in conformity with the common law of military usage. Thus, regiments of militia mustered into the service of the United States would be under the orders of a brigade commander of proper rank designated by law or by the President.

The act of July 17, 1862, conforms to the foregoing view of the constitutional provision and to the uniform practice of the Government. Section 2 of that act provides that the militia when called into service 'shall be organized in the mode prescribed by law for volunteers"-that is, the organization must be by batteries and regiments, and the officers of such batteries and regiments are to be appointed by the States; but the brigade, division, and army corps commanders are to be appointed by the President.

A familiar and effective mode of testing the correctness of any construction of a constitutional or legal provision is to consider the consequence of a different one. Let us suppose that militia in the service of the United State can be commanded only officers appointed by the States-for this matter of command is the real question involved. Suppose a single battery, battalion, or regiment of militia be called into service. It could under this view be commanded only by officers of the State in which it was raised. It might be attached to a brigade, division, or army corps of regulars or volunteers, but the generals of such commands could give it no orders. No use could be made of it until the particular State appointed an officer of higher rank than the commander could give it no orders. No use could be made of it until the particular State appointed an officer of higher rank than the commander of the corps, and the ten regiments from different States in the same corps, there must be ten distinct and independent commanders to that corps; for the appointment must be by the States respectively, and an officer appointed by one State cannot command the militia of another State while in the service of the United States. It can hardly be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended to authorize the use of the State militia in the service of the United States and at the same time to put such restrictions upon that use as to render it impossible.