the same mockery as before. The same men have been arrested and rearrested for desertion from two to five times. [See reports of Captains James, Eustace, and others.]

Not only should the extreme penalty be meted out to deserters found worthy of it, but far heavier pecuniary losses should attach than are now authorized. The reward allowed for the arrest of deserters has proved in this State entirely inadequate. Coupled, as it is, with the liability that the person arrested will not prove to be a deserter, and with the risk and danger attending capture, a sufficient number of the right kind of men cannot be found to engage in the business-in Illinois, at least- for the reward offered by the Government; and since even that has been withdrawn, no deserters are now arrested.

In my judgment the reward should not be less than $100 for each deserter arrested and restored to the service, the agent to bear all the expenses of every kind connected with the arrest and delivery at general rendezvous. This seems a large bounty, but I am satisfied that it would be in the end more economical even than the inadequate sums heretofore allowed. It would at once place a large and formidable force of detectives in the field, a knowledge of which, in addition to the heavy amount charged against deserters, would operate as a powerful check to desertions, the number of which would rapidly diminish. With such a stimulus I am satisfied that scarcely a deserter would have remained in Illinois after the end of the first year of the war. It is true that higher motives should enlist the services of citizens in such a work, but in point of fact such is not the case, and we must take things as they really are. I would also recommend stringent measures in the case of officers who restore deserters to duty without even the form or pretense of trial, as required by regulations. My attention has been called again and again to instances of that kind, the whole effect of which is discouraging to provost-marshals and demoralizing to the discipline of the Army.

6. Bounties.-It has seemed to me that if the Government deems it expedient to offer large bounties as an inducement to volunteer, it would be more prudent not to pay any part or installment of such bounties in advance. The large amount received from the Government by the soldier before he leaves the general rendezvous, added to the local bounty, which is often still larger, constitutes a very strong temptation to desert-too strong in many instances for resistance. I would therefore recommend, should the policy of large bounties be hereafter continued, that no part be paid until after the soldier has served a certain time.

But I am of the opinion that a still better policy would be, in future wars, to dispense with Government bounties altogether as a means of promoting volunteering, and, instead, to increase the regular pay of the soldier to such an extent as would enable him, with prudence and economy, to support his family or dependents while in the Army, relying upon the spirit of the people and such local bounties as particular communities might offer to secure volunteers, and when these resources failed, call in the aid of the draft.

The drain upon the National Treasury to pay such large bounties to such vast numbers of men is prodigious, and if continued would be absolutely ruinous. The amount of bounty necessary to secure a given result at successive stages of a war is, moreover, necessarily greater and greater. A sum that secures volunteers enough to fill one call will prove inadequate for the next call; and so the amount