supported by the First Missouri, in reserve, received the charge with a withering fire, and after the SECOND volley the enemy fled in confusion, leaving five colors on the field, and the ground strewn with the dead and wounded. One or two feeble attempts to rally were easily repulsed, and the day closed with the artillery and sharpshooters keeping up a continuos and heavy fire

The 20th and 21st were spent by the enemy in erecting new batteries and keeping up form daylight till dark the heaviest possible firing, both of musketry and artillery.

The 22nd passed in the same manner until about 2 p. m. when column was discovered advancing against the right of Shoup's bridge. It was immediately driven back. Another then approached on the right of the center. This was dispersed without great effort and with considerable loss. Again the enemy appeared in increased force on my right and Forney's left. He was promptly repulsed with heavy loss. This terminated the day's operations, with the exception of the same heavy fire of these several decider repulses, the enemy seemed to have abandoned the idea of taking by assault, and went vigorously at work to thoroughly invest and attack by regular approaches, and the history of one day in pretty much the history of all.

For the more particular description of operations o=you are respectfully referred to the daily reports of operations handed in during the siege. White the opposing force was running new parallels, establishing new works for heavy, guns, and gradually nearing our lines, we were strengthening our position, protecting the men with traverses and bomb proofs from the terrific fire of host and shell constantly poured in upon them, and which only cease at times, when the enemy seemed to have temporarily exhausted their supplies of ammunition. The fire of the enemy was only cease at times when the enemy seemed to have temporarily exhausted their supplies The fire of the enemy was only occasionally replied to, except when there were indication of an assault, or it became necessary to retard or stop operations on some particular work. The limited amount of ammunition on hand rendered this course necessary, though I am inclined to think caution in this respect was pushed rather to an extreme, and that a little more firing would have proved beneficial.

Toward the close of the siege the attack was mainly carried on my mining. Along my front the enemy exploded no mines on us. On the contrary, counter ones were prepared, and, when their galleries approached within proper distance, were charged and fired, an, it is believed, with all the desired effect.

The good conduct of both officers and men during the forty-seven days in the trenches in worthy of special praise. Neither one nor the other could have behaved better, and all credit is to be accorded the brigadier=generals and their staffs for their vigilance, activity, and heroic example set to their soldiers.

Brigadier-General Baldwin received a severe wound early in the siege, but reported for duty before its close, and, together with General Shoup, receives my special acknowledgments for gallant services.

The heaviest and most dangerous attack was on the extreme right, and nobly did the Twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eight and Thirty-first Louisiana repel and endure it. The casualties among the officer of these regiments indicate the nature of the defense required. In the Twenty-sixth Louisiana, major Martin 1 captain, and lieutenants killed, colonel W. Hall, severely wounded. In the Twenty-seventh Louisiana, lieutenant-Colonel, mc. Laurin, 1 captain, and 1 lieutenant killed, colonel L. D. Marks, dangerously,