At the same time all the troops were employed in constructing parapets of earth and cotton to cover the guns and rifle pits and stockades to cover the men. It was no part of the plan to assault the enemy's works, so that the main bodies of infantry were kept well in reserve, under cover, whilst skirmishers were pushed forward as close as possible, leading to many brisk skirmishes, which usually resulted in the enemy taking refuge within his works.

On the 12th, whilst General Lauman's DIVISION was moving up into position, dressing to his left on General Hovey, the right of his line came within easy range of the enemy's field artillery and musketry from behind his works, whereby this DIVISION sustained a serious loss, amounting in killed, wounded, and MISSING to nearly 500 men. This was the only serious loss which befell my command during the campaign, and resulted from misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of General Od's minute instructions on the part of General Lauman.

By the morning of the 13th of July, the enemy was completely invested in Jackson, and we were in full and undisputed possession of all the roads leading to the place on the WEST bank of Pearl River, and our artillery was within easy range of every part of the city, with the Statehouse in plain view, but the enemy exhibited an ample force at all points wherever we approached his parapet, and his artillery replied freely to ours. On starting from Big Black River we carried with us a good supply of ammunition, sufficient for an open field battle, but not for a siege; and the moment I saw that a siege was inevitable, I dispatched Captain McFarland, of my staff, back to Black River, to bring up a supply for such and event, and in the mean time our batteries were restricted in their use of ammunition so as to reserve at all times a sufficient quantity for an open field fight or a sally.

During the 12th and 13th, we threw into Jackson about 3,000 rounds, mostly from 10Parrotts and 12-pounder Napoleons, all of which did great execution.

General McArthur's DIVISION, of McPherson's corps, having been ordered up from Big Black River, at my request, on brigade was posted at Champion's Hill; the other two, under the general, reached Jackson on the morning of the 14th. I then only awaited the arrival of the ammunition train to open a furious cannonade on the town from all points of our line, when I learned that he enemy's cavalry had gone up Pearl River on the east side, 12 miles, to Grant's Mills, and crossed over to the WEST bank. This force was over 3,000 strong, being General Jackson's entire DIVISION. Suspecting his purpose to be an attack on our trains, and apprehensive for the safety of our ammunition, I ordered back to Clinton, during the night of the 14th, General Matthies' brigade to reenforce a regiment already stationed there, and by means of the telegraph, which had been constructed to my camp, put all armies along the road on their guard. One brigade of the enemy's cavalry approached Clinton on the morning of the 15th [16th], and was handsomely repulsed by General Matthies. The other brigade made its appearance at Bolton, and succeeded in capturing 8 wagons belonging to a pioneer company of the Thirteenth Army Corps, with 83 men, partly stragglers and partly composing this company, but did not attempt to attack the principal train, which was close by, well guarded by Chambers' brigade.

On the morning of the 15th, I dispatched a good brigade of infantry (Woods'), Landgraeber's battery of four light guns, and Bussed's cavalry toward Canton, partly to alarm this force of cavalry operating to our rear, but more especially to destroy the railroad as far out as the bridge across Big Black River, 40 miles north of Jackson. They en-