below the popular standard, claim that their advice was unheeded, and that fatal consequences resulted therefrom. My own opinions are-

1. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of the other grand armies.

2. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from Saint Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Ark., supplies collected while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened via Des Arc, on the White, and Madison, on the Saint Francis Rivers.

3. That as much of Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchee Rivers as can be gained and fortified be held, and the main army be transported thither by land and water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

4. That the line of the Yalabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Canton, and, lastly, where the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crosses the same river. The capture of Vicksburg would result.

5. That a force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed 10,000 men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point; this force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg, Haynes' Bluff, or Yazoo City.

6. I do doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I estimated to be 50 miles long and very tortuous) for a military channel, capable of supporting an army large enough to operate against Jackson, MISS., or Big Black River Bridge; and such a channel will be very valuable to a force coming from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coal and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the reach between Vicksburg and Red River.

7. The chief reason for operating solely by water was the season of the year and high water in Tallahatchee and Yalabusha. The spring is now here, as soon these streams will be on serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable to allow them to hold and make crese suggestions with the request that General Grant simply read them, and simply give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should not answer them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they deserve. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic support as though conceived by myself.

I do not believe General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson this spring.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN.

CORINTH, April 8, 1863.

Major-General HURLBUT:

Scouts in to-day from all points south give the arrangements as follows: Generals [W. M.] Inge, with 8,000 mounted men, and [J. R.] Chalmers, with 4,000 infantry, command the eleven northern counties of Mississippi. They are to watch and protect the front, from the Mississippi River to the north of Bear Creek, on Tuscumbia, to prevent any move south and closely watch us. They consider the attempt to