Vicksburg, that I am willing to believe he is concentrating at Bolton. If so, well, and better still if Vicksburg has surrendered. I send these papers in for the information of General Grant, who to-night will have arrived at some real conclusion and will be prepared to act.

If Vicksburg is ours, it is the most valuable conquest of the war, and the more valuable for the stout resistance it has made; if complete, we should follow up rapidly, but should leave nothing to chance. Of course we should instantly assume the offensive as against Johnston.

I now have the bridge at Osterhaus' position. I have five regiments and a battery at Messingers', 3 1/2 miles above Bridgeport, with orders to hold the opposite bank, and to-night to collect log-houses for piers, and materials for a double bridge, to be built the moment I know that Vicksburg has surrendered. I have my cavalry in possession of a ford above Bear Creek and below Birdsong. Now, Johnston may have under the pressure here collected a force of some 30,000. He has his old force, that of Loring, Breckinridge, and [J. P.] McCown's DIVISION, from Bragg, and a considerable force from Charleston and Mobile. If we have Vicksburg, we should start with as large a force as possible, and as soon as Johnston is met and his force developed, the balance of the plan of destroying road could be carried out by a small force.

I propose that Ord move out to the railroad bridge, my corps to Messinger's, Parke's in reserve to cross at same point, and W. S. Smith's DIVISION, with the cavalry, not exceeding 1,000 men, to cross at the ford below Birdsong; that all meet on the Bridgeport road, about 8 miles out, and move on Bolton, then direct on Jackson, and, if necessary, to Meridian, destroying, of course, the railroad and doing all manner of harm; then return to Jackson, whence I could send back to Vicksburg all troops not absolutely needed for the trip up to Grenada and back. Port Hudson is now well invested, and an increased force there could do less good than the destruction of the only army that can afford them relief, viz, Johnston's. But as soon as Johnston is met, and either defeated or dispersed, a force could go to Banks. I think the fall of Vicksburg, when known, will paralyze the Confederates WEST of the Mississippi, for Port Hudson was only used in connection with Vicksburg to make the intervening space a mare clausum, to which these forts gave the enemy absolute title. If these my views meet the general's approval, I ask the issue of a special order from your headquarters that Ord's corps move to railroad bridge, provided with five days' rations and 150 rounds of cartridges; the Fifteenth to be ordered to some forward, provided in line manner with the same rations and arder J. Condit Smith to organize a train of 200 wagons, with bread, salt, sugar, and coffee, to come forward in two trains by the same roads behind the troops; for all my staff to come forward at once, and, generally, all orders that will initiate the movement. As you see, I must still watch Johnston, and these preparations can be made better at your end. This would leave McPherson's corps at Vicksburg, Herron's DIVISION disposable, one brigade of which could hold the works at the railroad bridge, and Kimball's DIVISION at Haynes' Bluff.

Indeed, in the movement against Johnston we should risk nothing, provided Vicksburg is surely surrendered. The news is so good I can hardly believe it, and I am confused by the sound of cannon at Vicksburg this p. m.

I keep a swift officer at the telegraph office, 3 miles back, to bring me the earliest intelligence. If all is right and Vicksburg is surrendered, after ordering troops to move as suggested, it may be well to order my quartermaster, J. Condit Smith, to ride out quickly to see me after