necessary, and therefore I gave you as my deliberate opinion that the advantage would be cheaply purchased at 500, and not too dearly with the sacrifice of 1,000 men in killed and wounded. All these details, the importance of moving in time to make an early attack in the morning, in order that you might be able to return to your entrenchments at daybreak on the following morning, where, if the enemy were in any force we might expect an attack upon our the lines in return for the attack upon Petersburg, if at all, were fully explained to you, and upon your suggestion that the march of your troops (which, however, by no accident could exceed 20 miles) would be too fatiguing, I stated to you that if successful in your attack on Petersburg, you might content yourself by sending back 1,000 of the negro troops, with which I would endeavor to hold the entrenchments; and that, knowing their marching capabilities, I had no doubt of their being able to come in.

It was further explained to you that, if you got into Petersburg and destroyed the bridges so as to put the Appomattox without means of being crossed between General Kautz and the enemy's forces in front of our line of entrenchments, he was then to proceed down the railroad with his cavalry, destroying it as far as he could, until he was opposed by a sufficient force of the enemy guarding the railroad to cause him to turn back.

At 5.10 in the afternoon of the 8th instant, in answer to your suggestion as to taking two batteries of artillery, I replied to you, I though "two sections of a battery would be sufficient, because this is not to be artillery work, but a quick, decisive push." You informed me that you intended to take four regiments and that you hardly knew how you could take any single brigade, because many of the men of each brigade were on picket, and to withdraw the pickets and change them before the usual time would give the enemy notice that a movement was contemplated. I therefore authorized you to form a composite brigade of four regiments, from the regiments not on picket, to obviate that difficulty, and stated that I supposed those four regiments would be at least equal in numbers to the negro regiments with which I had intended to make one of the attacks. In violation of that understanding, knowing how much you weakened our line here, and without my knowledge, you took five regiments, to wit: Seventh Connecticut, Third New Hampshire, Seventh New Hampshire, Sixth Connecticut, and Sixty-second Ohio, and although directed, by my order of the 10th, to "state all the regiments, companies, and detachments which you took with you," you have, either carelessly or purposely, concealed the fact that you took the fifth regiment, and have made no mention of the cavalry or artillery which you toke with you. How such an omission could carelessly have happened under my order to you to "carefully note each particular of this order and see that each is answered specifically," and to "state also the regiments, companies, and detachments you had with you independent of Generals Kaut'z and Hinks' commands," will require explanation.

Further, in contravention of your own deliberative opinion given to me, you took the fifth regiment from the line of pickets, not giving it time hardly to get ready before it was required to be in order to march. Instead then, of marching at a proper hour to reach the other side at 12 o'clock, where you yourself desired me to send a staff officer to order General Hinks to report to you at 12 o'clock,