CHAP.XIII.] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-CONFEDERATE.

men to you, one of whom will bear this communication. This step is not taken from an ignoble desire to avoid the responsibility, but from my knowledge of the extent of the disaster which must ensue if the enemy shall be able to penetrate the country by this route. My left flank, which I had hoped would by this time have been made secure, is entirely exposed, and I cannot possibly prevent the enemy landing n it in any force he may choose. I have neither the guns to mount there nor the works to put them in. The latter have not been commenced, for I knew I could not get guns to place in them even if finished. There is not time now to erect them for any immediate defense. It must, therefore, be defended by troops, and I have not troops in numbers sufficient for that purpose, at the lowest calculation. I venture to suggest that perhaps 4,000 or 5,000 volunteers might be temporarily ordered to me from North Carolina, as that State must be deeply interested in the results here. With these I could defend, I feel assured, successfully this flank, and with the few militia I asked for, and whom I could arm, I could man the works at Williamsburg and Jamestown, and make the Peninsula secure against a land attack. As guns were made they could be furnished for this place and the James River, and we could then defy the Federal Government in this quarter.

I beg to commend the gentlemen, Colonel Hill Carter, Colonel Randolph, chief of artillery, and Mr. St. John, chief engineer, of the latter of whom I spoke to you when in Richmond, to your kind attention .

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER, Major-General, Commanding.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Raleigh, N. C., December 16, 1861.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederate States:

SIR: The possession of Hatteras affords the enemy a position or nucleus to form expeditions, almost without observation, to radiate to different points, even in opposite directions. To be in front, we must be in constant occupation and vigilance of the entire circumference of two large inland sounds. The sounds may be suddenly and at any unexpected time filled with a superior and overwhelming force of gunboats and steam-tugs, so that their navigation for any purpose is very hazardous and rash; and yet both of these sounds, with all their tributaries and seaport towns, are under the command of one brigadier-general.

A glance at the map will satisfy you it is too extensive a command even if it were readily accessible, but the precarious navigation of the sounds not only separates the command, but requires a circuitous inland route for either officers or their orders. Let me therefore respectfully ask of you to divide our coast defense (now two divisions) into three or more.

An examination of the map, or any further inquiry into this subject, will satisfy of the propriety of this suggestion.

In connection with this subject I will invite your special attention to Roanoke Island, which separates the two sounds. Here are the fortifications and batteries on the west of the island to prevent the passage of the enemy from Hatteras or Pamlico into Albemarle.