cial orders of General Lee, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, under date of August 24. On the same day General floyd wrote to me that he had good, reasons to believe that the enemy had abandoned all idea of crossing the Gauley River in force; that he doubted the intention of the enemy to make an attack upon him, adding,"but I am fully able to defend myself against the combined force of General Cox and colonel Tyler both together, and court their assault." He alluded to what he called "silly rumors among the teamsters and camp followers" about the danger of his being surround and cut off, and asked me to correct these rumors. By the 25th he would be rady to cross the gauley with his artillery. The truth was that on the 23rd General Floyd did lose the only little ferry-boat he had, with four men drowned,a nd he was in danger of being cut off. I had to obtain nails and plank ot construct a new and beater boat.

By this time General Floyd had the first two regiments he brought into the field, 1,200; Colonel Wharton's regiment, about 400; Corn's and Beckett's cavalry, 100; two pieces and about 40 men of the State volunteer artillery; three pieces and 61 men of my artillery, and Colonels Tompkins' and McCausland's regiments, little less than 800 men, making in all 2,600 men, less the number sick and on furlough..

On the 24th of August, at 8.30 o'clock p. m., I wrote to him fully, showing him how closely I had scouted the enemy, having been myself in person, pistol in hand, in their camp at Westlake's. On the same day, however, he informed me that on that evening he had received information that 500 of the enemy were encamped within 5 miles of Camp Gauley, and he ordered that I would send him at once one of my regiments-the strongest. He also called for an iron howitzer, ordered 40 rounds of cartridges for the infantry and 100 for the howitzer. This note was received by me at 2.30 o'clock a. mm. August 25, and on the same day I replied that an order issued by him to Captain Jenkins, in command of his cavalry, interfering and conflicting with my command, had caused Jenkins to be ambuscaded and badly round by the enemy, and that the disaster had called out my infantry in force,a nd had delayed my sending my regiment on the evening of the 25th. (In my letter of the 27th of August, addressed to General Floyd, will be found a description of the ambuscade and rout of Captain Jenkins.) I promised him the required re-enforcements for the morning of the 26th, and that I would hold my whole force ready to re-enforce him. Again, on the 25th of August, General Floyd wrote to me that if all the forces from Gauley advanced upon him I ought to give him the benefit of my whole force, but said that with one of my regiments at the river and my others at Dogwood Gap, ready to march at a moment's warning, he would look upon his position there as nearly impregnable. Again, on the same day, he wrote at 3 o'clock p. m.:

The enemy are very near us; their advance guard within 3 miles. You will dispatch your strongest regiment to my support, and hold your entire command, if you can do this, within supporting distance.

P. S.-3.30 o'clock p. m. Enemy advancing in battle array.

On examining my infantry after returning from the relief of Colonel Jenkins, learning the movement of the enemy on the turnpike, seeing the danger of the enemy going up the Saturday road to Carnifix to General Floyd's rear, I called for reports form Colonels Henningsen and Richardson, showing the reasons why my forces should not be reduced, meager as they were from the measles, and showing also that it was best for the safety of General Floyd's command that I should not move without further orders. Accordingly, on the 27th, I wrote.