to General Floyd and asked for further orders. Events proved that I was right. The advance guard of the enemy was but one regiemtn (that of Tyler), a set of lubberly Dutchmen, whom General Floyd surprised at breakfast, and routed them without losing a man. They were doubt-less sent forward ot induce the concentration of my forces at Carnifix and to catch General Floyd's and my forces both in the same trap at the same time. And on the 29th August General Floyd addressed to me his letter Numbers 25, saying that since his signal success and the utter dispersion and demoralization of the enemy, he thought I might then advantageously move towards Gauley Bridge and take possession of the strong position at and about the Hawk's Nest; that in all probability the enemy were likely to retire down the Kanawha, and that I should be close at hand to annoy their retiring columns. He did not reprove me for exercising a sound discretion in this instance; on the contrary, he approved my action,a nd ordered me still farther from his position. But I regret to say that this letter could not be concluded without a wanton sneer at the senior officer of my infantry, Colonel Henningsen.

From the first mention of the occupation of Carnifix Ferry I urged upon General Floyd the importance of that ferry, as commanding the stem of all the roads to the rear on the turnpike. To this en we could hold it on the left bank or south side o Gauley with a very small force, say 250 men, if heir rear were well covered, so as to prevent the approach of the enemy towards them from the turnpike. By holding that stem and advancing our forces to the foot of the Saturday road, and to where the Chesnutburg road enters the turnpike (the months site sides), we could have forced the enemy to approach ont eh turnpike alone in single column, and could have met him with or concentrated defenses without much danger of having our flanks turned. It was utterly unmilitary to have crossed Carnifix Ferry, unless General floyd had force enough to advance. I warned him that this would compel him to divide his command, already too weak when combined; that if he crossed, the enemy might advance upon him rom Summersville, from Gauley Bridge up the Gauley, and form Gauley Bridge up the Saturday road, thus attacking him with superior numbers front and flank attack on the right bank of the Gauley, I would be too weak, perhaps, to prevent the enemy from falling on his rear on the left bank of the Gauley' that his ferriage, too, was insufficient for the retreat of hiss command; whereas, if we took the position I advised, we would hold Miller's ferry also, on the New River, and could spur the enemy to withdraw a considerable portion of his forces or Gauley Bridge; that as long as he insisted on crossing that ferry, and thus exposing himself, it would be impossible for me to re-enforce him from across the river, without exposing the safety of both commands tot he same disaster of having our retreat cut off. But no; all this obvious reasoning was in vain. Cross he would, and cross he did. I asked, Cui bono?-to what end?-to what result? If he wanted to hold Carnifix Ferry, he could do to with one-tenth the number of men on his side. But that was not he sole object. The answer I got was that the President desired the destruction of the trestle-work of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, or it was to "break the line of the enemy." or it was to go down Gauley to Twenty Mile-go up Twenty Mile to Bell Creek-go up Bell Creek to its head, and thence to Hughes' Creek, and down Hughes' Creek to the.