Kanawha Valley, 15 miles only below Gauley Bridge. All these views were about equally absurd. The idea that he would be attacked either from Sutton or from Birch Mountain he utterly scouted, and the battle of knives and forks at Cross-Lanes had elated my senior ot such an extent, that he thought himself impregnable in his position and capable of accomplishing impossibilities. I made it my business to do as he bade me-to watch the enemy and to protect General Floyd's rear; also to keep General Lee advised of my movements.

In my letter to General Lee of the 28th August the President and Secretary of War will see my full report of the first movement to Carnifix. On the 31st August General Floyd notified me that the enemy had abandoned Gauley Bridge and were advancing on him; that I near Gauley (meaning the cliffs of Carnifix Ferry), and that I should at once advance with the remainder of my force (about 900 or 1,00 men), and take possession of the enemy's camp at the mount of the Gauley. He also asked me to send him two companies of cavalry-his, since their stampede, having been sent all the way back to Greenbrier. These orders were given to me, notwithstanding he had but little doubt of the retreat of the enemy from Gauley Bridge, and although he much doubted their intention ot march in his direction. The absurdity of these orders caused me to address to him my letter from Dogwood Gap of August 31,10 o'clock p. m. Again, on the 31st August, 12 o'clock m., he addressed me another letter, in which he said that the enemy were advancing upon him in full force from Gauley Bridge, were within 12 miles of him, in full fore from Gauley Bridge, were within 12 miles of him, and advancing upon him in full force from Gauley Bridge, were within 12 miles of him, and calling upon me for 1,000 of my infantry, my best battery, and one squadron of horse. This was received by me between 4 and 5 o'clock a. m. of September 1. That morning I moved again in full force towards Carnifix, and was descending the road to the ferry,when one of his officers put into my hands his order of September 1, saying of the enemy required the union of my force iwht his, as embraced in wood) until further orders, and sneered another insult about the report of Colonel Henningsen.

I was o disgusted by these vacillating and harassing orders, that I determined at once iwht promptitude and dispatch to drive the enemy as far as possible back upon the turnpike towards their camped Gauley Bridge. I returned to Dogwood on the evening of September 1, rested men that night, and the next day (September 2) drove the enemy back west of Big Creek, and gained an advance of more than 13 miles upon the turnpike. With what gallantry and skill this was done by my men and officers you will see in my report to General Floyd of September 4. I have just ascertained an error in my estimate of the enemy's force on that occasion. I now learn from a perfectly reliable source that their force was larger than I had supposed, reaching na aggregate of 3,000 men.

On the same day I addressed to him a second letter, asking him to re-enforce me with the whole or a part of Colonel Tompkins' regiment and by returning to me my corps of artillery.

On the 6th of September I repeated the request, giving him very serious reasons for doing so. On the same day he actually re-enforced me with Colonel Tompkins' regiment, and sent back my two pieces of artillery and 61 men, under Lieutenant Hart, for which I thanked him by a letter of the same date..