While at the ford I received a dispatch from headquarters of the army, dated there at 1 p. m., stating that my delay in reaching the river had retarded the operations of General Warren more than two hours and calling for explanation. I stated in my reply that my corps had 4 miles farther to march than General Warren. I will now state, in addition, that the selection of the place of crossing, for which I am not at all responsible, was of such a nature as to require the greatest exertions on my part to get over as rapidly as I did. Another dispatch from headquarters Army of the Potomac, dated 3 p. m., directed that-

I should not move forward farther from the river than to clear the way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses.

This dispatch also charged that my artillery delayed that corps, the Sixth, by being stuck at the crossing at Mountain Run. An additional reason for the delay of my artillery was given by Captain Randolph, chief of artillery of this corps, that the trains of the headquarters Army of the Potomac blocked up the road, checking the advance.

I reported the impracticability of crossing artillery at Jacobs' Ford, and received orders, dated 4.30 p. m., headquarters Army of the Potomac, to send my artillery to cross at Germanna. In consequence of the bad state of the roads between the two fords on both sides of the river only one of my batteries got through that night, and another after I had marched on the morning of the 27th. The guide who was sent to me with this dispatch was given to General Prince, who renewed the march at daylight on the 27th.

At 8.30 a. m. on the 27th, I directed Major Norvell, assistant adjutant-general, to go to General Prince and find out whether he was on the right road, and whether he communicated with General Warren. General Prince replied that he did not know whether he was on the right road or not, and that he had not communicated with General Warren, but had sent a reconnoitering party to try and do it; that a squadron of cavalry had been advanced up the Raccoon Ford road and encountered a cavalry picket of the enemy, which, after some skirmishing, was driven in.

At 9.30 I ordered Major Norvell with an escort and an aide-de-camp to return to the front, and report to me when General Prince had communicated with General Warren. General Prince reported that he had communicated with General Warren, and that he, General Warren, had sent him word that the understood his (Prince's) position perfectly. At the same time General Prince also reported that he had withdrawn the cavalry, as it had developed a large force of the enemy.

From these various delays, and the reports received from my staff officers, I became satisfied that the head of my column had struck the Raccoon Ford road, near the enemy's intrenched position on Mine Run, which fact was fully confirmed during the subsequent battle, by the heavy artillery, which enfiladed my line. I therefore determined to throw my line forward, deploying to my left, having in view a connection with Warren on my left. I communicated that fact to the general commanding the army.

About the time my leading division was deployed, it came in contact with the skirmishers of the enemy, a large column of whom was moving down the Raccoon Ford road, toward Robertson's Tavern. Deploying another division on the left of this, it also became engaged,