and for over an hour the whole of this line was fiercely attacked. I now ordered my remaining division (the First) into position, bringing up my artillery on the right, thus attacking the enemy with my whole force, driving him back across the Raccoon Ford road, when at dusk the fighting gradually ceased, my line having advanced over the battle-field beyond the enemy's dead and wounded. In the course of that night, the right road to Robertson's Tavern having been discovered by engineer officers from army headquarters, the Sixth Corps, which was a mile and a half in the rear of my line of battle, was ordered to proceed to Robertson's Tavern, take position on the right of Warren, directing me to join whenever I could.

It having been reported that the enemy had fallen back, at daylight I moved to the road taken by the Sixth Corps, and following, overtook it 1 mile from Robertson's Tavern, at 9 a. m., where I reported my arrival to army headquarters.

Since receiving the call for this statement, General Prince has been called upon by me for a report, and states that-

At 6.30 a. m. the order to move was received. I left my quarters with my staff at ten minutes past 7. At about five minutes past 8 the last brigade of my division left its camp ground. I should say the head of my column moved at half-past 7.

By this it will be seen (by the report of my aides-de-camp and General Prince) that although he received the preparatory order in due time, he lost an hour from the time he received the order of execution, for which loss he has assigned no reason. That, in connection with his habitual slowness of movement, as exhibited in his preparation for to conduct the column upon the route which was subsequently followed (but which was not designated on the map furnished for my guidance, the roads marked down there being entirely wrong and calculated to mislead), the imperfect reconnaissance which caused Jacobs' Ford to be selected as a place of crossing, and the subsequent unavoidable contact with the enemy, resulting in a serious engagement, are the causes to which are attributable the inability of the Third Corps to arrive at Robertson's Tavern sooner than it did.

I have now given you the "full explanation" which you have called for of all the facts and circumstances which in any way bear upon the causes of the delays and failures referred to. Had your communication been simply confined to calling from me this statement,my duty would here have ended, but it has been thought proper to state that-

Through the delays and specified, an opportunity was lost of attacking the enemy before he had concentrated, and that this had a powerful influence upon the result of the movements of this army.

Now, I assert that without losing an unnecessary moment the enemy was attacked, and in very large force, before he had concentrated. That General Warren, whom your dispatches to me reported as in the presence of the enemy during that day, had the same opportunity, while my corps was engaging them, to have done the same thing.

That during the engagement prisoners were taken from Rodes' and Johnson's divisions in my front, showing that I was fighting two-thirds of Ewell's corps, and that within supporting distance of General Warren, who was within sound of my guns. Had he thought proper to have made a vigorous attack upon those in front