of him, my opinion is that the result of the movements of this army might have been entirely different, but that confining himself to one single idea, rejecting the vicissitudes of a march resulting from obstacles over which the best generalship may sometimes have no control, his movements were made my objective point regardless of the rules and principles which all experience shows are necessary to success.

I claim that from the moment I met the enemy my order was executed; that the junction with General Warren was then made, as intended by the general commanding the army; that this corps fought the enemy and defeated him, and had the battle been fought by the Second Corps against those troops in its front, and had it succeeded, as I believe it would have done (in conjunction with the operations of the Sixth Corps, known to have been within supporting distance), the occasion for this report would not have arisen.

I furthermore declare that the position assigned to me on the left of the line of battle on the 28th, when I had reported at Robertson's Tavern, not only was outflanked by the enemy's line, but that the plank road running perpendicular to it would have obliged me to leave a strong portion of my corps to protect my guns and trains exposed to the enemy's attack during my advance upon works 1 mile in my front. There reasons influenced my opinion as to the injudiciousness of attacking, and my doubt of the success which would attend it as far as my position was concerned.

All the corps commanders, on the council on the evening of the 28th, also gave adverse opinion, upon what grounds I do not remember. The general commanding there stated his previous want of information of the topography of the country, and called upon corps commanders for suggestions regarding a new mode of attack. I proposed to fall back and take a line of battle toward the fords, inducing the enemy to leave the formidable heights and attack us.

Major-General Warren proposed to take a light column and gain the enemy's rear, and distract him white the remainder of the army made an assault on his front. The major-general commanding assented to this proposition, and added to the Second Corps a division of the Sixth Corps, in all about 18,000 men, which moved at daylight on the 29th.

On the evening of that day, I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding renewing to me the question as to an assault upon the enemy on my front, and as matters had not changed, as far as I was informed, since my verbal opinion of the night before, I gave the same views over my own signature I had then given.

Simultaneous with this dispatch, at 7.30 p. m., another was received, requesting my immediate presence at headquarters of the army. I followed up my dispatch, arriving there shortly after it, when, to my astonishment, I found there Major-General Warren, whom I had supposed to be on his march to the enemy's rear. It subsequently appeared that so far from making the proposed detour, he had quietly marched up the plank road and taken position on my left. General Meade then informed me that he had changed his plan of attack, and taken two of my divisions and given them to General Warren, in consequence of the note above alluded to, making that officer's force about 28,000 men.

The attack was then ordered for the following morning at 8 a. m., myself with one division in the center, and Sedgwick with 18,000 men on the right. At that hour the attack began, and after my first